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aw school professors are known for devising complex, convoluted examination question s with factual situations at best rem o tely associated with reality.
The following, for a fictitious law of war course fin al examination, might b e viewed
as represen tative:
State A is a sovereign State with a functioning government enjoying diplomatic
relations with other nations. It is a member o f the United Nations in good standing and
since 1956 a State party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It is not a State party to the
1977 Protocols I and II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Stale B invades State A, displaces its government, and installs its own government.
States C, D, E and others covertly provide funding and other support, including
weapons, to indigenous resistance movements within State A, eventually forcin g State
B to withdraw. Subsequently, the puppet government installed by State B during its
occupation is overthrown bya tribal faction (Faction I) covertly funded and supported
by States C and D. Other tribes (Faction 2), with limited support from outside sources,
oppose rule by Faction I. Neither replaces the previous government as the factions
compete for control. The situation deteriorates into a civil war.
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Factions 1 and 2 are loose amalgamations of occasional if disparate indigenous tribal
alliances. Following long-standing custom within State A, tribal groups change sides,
and back again, as battle momentum shifts. Faction 1 replaces personnel casualties and
tribal defections primarily from a pool of volunteer and dragooned men of the same
tribe in neighboring State C, divided by an official but artificial border created by an
unsuccessful colonial power a century earlier that bisects historic. common tribal
territory.
Given their heavy financial investment in support of Faction 1 and. in the case of State
C. for geopolitical reasons, States C and D decide they will recognize Faction 1 as the
government of State A when Faction 1 gains control of the entire country. Each
prematurely recognizes Faction 1 when it captures Faction 2's major city. Faction 1'5
success is short-lived. It suffers a significant military defeat, and retreats from Faction
2's major city and the territory Faction 2 controls. Resistance to Faction 1 continues
with varying levels of intensity throughout State A except in its territory of origin, the
southern one-third of State A.
Neither State C nor D withdraws its premature recognition of Faction I. State F joins
States C and D in recognizing Faction 1 in order to continue bird-hunting privileges its
wealthy leaders enjoy in State A.
Faction 1 aggressively but unsuccessfully solicits r«ognition as the government of
State A from the United Nations. the European Union o r any of the remaining 190
nations. It hosts a transnational terrorist group, which trains and organizes foreign
nationals within State A before the group attacks two embassies of State E in other
nations, killing 224 civilians and injuring more than 4,000. State E responds with
limited military action against training camps of the transnational terrorist group and
requests that Faction 1 deliver to it the leader of the terrorist group. Faction 1 offers to
do so if State E will recognize it. State E will not, and Faction 1 does not. Stale D support
of and relations with Faction I deteriorate because of Faction l's hosting the leader of
the transnatio nal terrorist group, a former citizen of State D. Faction 1 rapidlyhecomes
an international pariah. Faction I's power within the territory it controls declines.
Subsequently the transnational terrorist group hosted by Faction 1 launches a major
attack on the territory of State E, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). Almost three thousand people, primarily civilians, representing more than
ninety nations are killed or missing and presumed dead. The United Nations Security
Council and NATO support military action against Faction 1 and the transnational
terrorist group. State E joins with military forces of State G and those of other
governments to engage in military operations in State A against tribal forces aligned
with Faction I and the transnational terrorist group. States C, D and F withdraw their
recognitions of Faction 1.
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Throughout the fighting, Faction 1 tribes continue to operate in indigenous attire
under tribal command and control rather than as conventional, highly structured,
uniformed military forces. Members of the transnational terrorist group dress in all
black or indigenous attire. Some special operations forces (SOF) from States E. G and
other nations allied with them working with Faction 2 forces dress in Faction 2 tribal
attire to avoid being targeted as high-value targets by Faction I and its transnational
terrorist partners.
Tribal forces aligned with Faction I abandon their informal alliance with it to join with
Faction 2 and military forces of States E and G to defeat Faction 1. The leaders of
Faction I and the transnational terrorist group flee into tribal territorial areas in State C
A new leader is identified to head a national, democratically elected government in
State A. His government gains recognition from the United Nations and national
governments (including States B, C. 0 , E, F and G) as the government of State A.
In the process of the military operations against Faction I and its transnational terrorist
partner by States E and G, members of Faction I and the terrorist group are captured.
What is the law of war status of the members of Faction 1 and transnational terrorist
group forces captured during operations by States E and G? Had States E and G special
operations forces wearing Faction 2 attire been captured by Faction 1 forces or its
transnational terrorist partners, would they have been entitled to prisoner of war
status?
Before the al-Qaeda attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the
military response of the United States against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the scenario would have qualified as humorously improbable enough to have been a law
school examination question. But it was precisely the situation faced by US and coalition military forces as they entered Afghanistan to commence offensive military
operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in October 200t.
A sim ple--or perhaps better said, simplistic-approach would be to review the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions to determine their applicability to Taliban and alQaeda fighters or to the SOF of States E and G wearing indigenous attire of the faction with which they Were aligned. l However, as the fictitious professor's examination question suggests, the situation is far from simple. More information is
necessary from factual, cultural and historical standpoints prior to determining the
legal statuses of the individuals in question.
In an essay published in 2003, this author conduded that the Taliban was not the
government of Afghanistan at the time coalition operations began against it in late
200P Three highly respected colleagues argued that the Taliban was the de facto
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government of Afghanistan.) Subsequent scholarship by historians. regional experts, military officers who served in Afghanistan during the period in question ,
official military histories and others provide more information than did contemporary media reports. enabling a clearer picture from which to conduct a fresh
analysis of Taliban status. Moreover, media accounts in large do not understand
legal nuances, such as the distinction between physical presence of armed groups
in an area. international law conditions for a group to be regarded as a government or law of war criteria for occupation. "Occupation" in media parlance is a
general term significantly different from the latter.
Following is a summary of the situation that existed during the period in question; analysis of the Taliban's status as a government and the combatant status of
Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters; brief consideration of the law of war issue of US and
other nations' special operations forces' wear of indigenous attire as they fo ught
the Taliban and al-Qaeda; and analysis of the Bush administration's legal rationale
for denial of prisoner of war status to captured al-Qaeda and Taliban.
In considering the fact situation and legal determinations one may draw from it,
two leading scholars have emphasized the importance of information beyond the
face of applicable treaties. Writing in his classic 19 11 War Rights on Land, James
Moloney Spaight argued:
War law has never been presented to officers in an attractive form, as it might have been
(I submit with diffidence) if the writers had insisted on the historical, human, and
practical side rather than on the legal and theoretical one. But the difficulty of the
subject, and the necessity for a careful study of it have not been brought home to
officers: they underestimate its importance and complexity.4

More than eight decades later, Spaight's view was shared by Sir Adam Roberts:
The laws of war are strange not only in their subject matter, which to many people
seems a contradiction in terms, but also in their methodology. There is little tradition
of disciplined and reasoned assessment of how the laws of war have operated in
practice. Lawyers, academics, and diplomats have often been better at interpreting the
precise legal meaning of existing accords or at generalizing about the circumstances in
which they can or cannot work. In short, the study of the law needs to be integrated
with the study of history: if not, it is inadequate.5

While the present author agrees with Spaight and Sir Adam as to the necessity to
know and understand relevant history in order to apply the law, in cases such as the
conflict in Afghanistan knowledge of more than history is necessary. An appreciation of a nation's history, its culture, its geography and other local factors may be
250

W. Hays Parks
necessary. Interpreting and applying the law of war is not always a matter of mirror
imaging or " one size fits all. " These factors are relevant in interpreting nuances in
law of war treaties in order to determine their application. Understand ing Afghanistan's regional and national history, its geograph y, its culture, political structure
and law of war history are important in determining whether captured Taliban
were entitled to prisoner of war status. So, too, are the history of the law of war and
the history of (and therefore the meaning and intent 00 specific treaty provisions.
There is no evidence any of these fac tors were considered by senior political leaders
and legal ad visers in provid ing advice to President George W. Bush with regard to
prisoner of war entitlement for captured Taliban. Looking at the con flict in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the United States and its coalition partners as
one might consider an armed conflict in (for example) NOlW"ay, Switzerland or
Australia is akin to considering the most common way to core an apple while holding a baseball; each may have the same shape, but o thelW"ise they are uniquely different. Political and military leaders and their legal advisers must be mindfu1 of the
risk of automatically assuming all opponents and all situations fit neatly within the
same treaty template. In the opening stages of US operations in Afghanistan , ignorance and skepticism of the law of war by som e within the Bush administration resulted in errors of law and judgm ent with res pect to the legal basis for law of war
protection for captured Taliban and al-Qaeda, and the legal rationale for denial of
prisoner of war status to them.1>
In this regard this author has heard it said, "As all 194 nations are State parties
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, they have universal applicability." This statement, while fac tually and legally accurate, fails to recognize that legal applicability
differs from application in fact. The quoted statement tends to suggest a perfect
mirror im aging in application. The title of the volume in which Sir Adam 's comments are contained-The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western
World-acknowledges not only the predominately Western European origins of
the law of war but the challenges that may be faced in its application outside nations of Western European tradition.1
It is in this context that the q uestion of the statuses of combatants in the war
fo ught by the United States and its allies against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in late 2001 is examined. The specifi c time fram e will be from the arrival
of the first US military ground force elem ents in Afghanistan o n October 20, 200 1,8
to the signing of a mem orandum by President George W. Bush on February 7,2002
which, inter alia, accepted the conclusion of the Department of Justice denying
prisoner of war status to captured Taliban and al-Qaeda. 9
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Afghanistan
Afghanistan has been described as having "three constants: perpetual internal
fighting between tribal ethnic groups, the dominance of Jslam in society, and intervention by external actors using this discord to achieve influence in the country."10
A nation divided by mountainous terrain, limited in modern transportation development and with few large cities contributes to emphasis on tribal loyalty, a highly
decentralized form of government and strong resistance to central authority by its
citizens.ll Understanding its culture and local dynamics is critical to understanding Afghanistan; in contrast to Western European nations, controlling Afghanistan's capital city of Kabul does not necessarily equal control of the entire nation,
for example. 12 Even within tribes, rivalries and blood feuds were and are a constant.
Historian Louis Dupree observed, "No Pashtun [the ruling class in Afghanistan for
more than two centuries 13 ] likes to be ruled by another ... particularly someone
from another tribe, sub-tribe, or section. "14 As is the case in other tribal-centric nations, tribes in Afghanistan historically have been inclined to suspend tribal rivalries and blood feuds to resist foreign invasion, if only briefly enough to defeat them
before returning to their internal competition.1$ Shultz and Dew offer a Somali
proverb that could be said to apply equally well to Afghanistan tribal warrior ways:
Me and my dan against the world;
Me and my family against my dan;
Me and my brother against my family;
Me against my brother. 16
In the same context, the same authors, while again referring to d an tradition in
Somalia, quote I. M. Lewis's observation that applies equally well to Afghanistan's
tribal traditions: "Although they esteem fighting so highly, the pastoralists have no
standing military organization or system of regiments. Armies and raiding parties
are ad hoc formations and while feuds often last for years, and sometimes generations, they are generally waged in guerrilla campaigns."17
Afghanistan's history has included invasion by foreign powers and competition
for its control as a commercial route or "buffer zone" by foreign governments,
most commonly known for the nineteenth-century competition between England
and Russia firs t named "The Great Game" by Captain Arthur Conolly of the Bengal
Cavalry, later popularized by Rudyard Kipling in his 1901 novel Kim.ls In fighting
one another or foreign invaders, alliances often were based on bargaining more
than loyalties, and loyalties were fleeting. Tribal forces changed sides frequently as
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each saw the tide of battle shifting or if offered "a better deal" by the opposing force
or a better chance for post-conflict success. 19
Interim His tory: The British Colonial Period
British military histol)' in Afghanistan is long in period of time, extensive, but for
the most part beyond the scope of this author's topic. 20 However, it contains one
point germane to understanding the situation on the ground in October 2001 and
through the period in question.
The artificiality of Afghanistan's borders, particularly with respect to its eastern
border with Pakistan, is the result of an arbitrary nineteenth-century colonial division of tribal territol)' for British security purposes. It is named for Sir Henry
Mortimer Dumnd, who negotiated and drew a line dividing Wazari tribal territory
to establish a border between Afghanistan and what today is Pakistan. In addition
to the fact that a line drawn on a map seldom is easy to find with precision on the
ground, particularly in termin as rugged as that between Pakistan and Afghanistan,
the "backdoor" it offered between the two nations played heavily in mujahidin support in fighting the Soviet occupation and Wazari support for the Taliban following the Soviet departure. Permanently resentful of the British-established border
and accustomed to traveling unfettered by multiple footpaths between the two nations,ll tribal traditions and support in armed conflict against opposing forceswhether indigenous or foreign-meant more to determining the way the Taliban
manned, formed and commanded its forces than Western concepts of defined and
marked borders, their sanctity, and military command and control. Tribal loyalty
remained paramount. 12
Afghanistan enjoyed relative stability and modernization during the reign of
King Muhammed Zahir Shah (1933-1973). A "constitutional monarchy" was established on October I, 1963.23 On July 17, 1973, his cousin Daoud executed a
bloodless coup during the king's absence from the country to abolish the monarchy and become Afghanistan's first president and head of the communist People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Unable to achieve nationwide economic and agricultural reform,24 he was murdered five years later by PDPA members. His assassination and other PDPA failures eventually led to the overt Soviet
invasion on December 22, 1979. 25
The Soviet occupation, Afghan resistance and US covert assistance to the latter
against the former have been well told and became the subject of a popular movie.26
Soviet forces faced a mujahidin resistance repeating the historic practice of indigenous foes joining forces to resist a foreign invader.27 Unable to defeat the
mujahidin resistance funded and supplied by China, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and the
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United States and strongly supported by the indigenous population, the Soviet
40th Army withdrew on February 15, 1989. 28
US and other fo reign support to the mujahidin led to a case of unintended consequences, as it left heavily-armed forces in Afghanistan, described by one author
as "a network of jihadis without a jihad."29 Refugee male children from the Soviet
war in Afghanistan were placed in Saudi-funded madrassas in Pakistan teaching
the conselVative Wahhabi rejection of "all modern interpretations of Islam as well
as the mystical Sufi fonn of Isiam,"X1 in essence providing a "farm club" of holy
warriors fo r the Taliban in its eventual effort to seize control of Afghanistan even
before the Taliban existed in name. Foreign financing of the mujahidin resistance
funneled through Pakistan's Inter-$elVices Intelligence Directorate (ISlO) reversed religious toleration and other modern, liberal practices that existed in the
1970s, replacing them with narrow Islamic views}l
Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan left in place remnants of the weak
Afghan (PDPA) Army and the POPA puppet regime headed by President Mohammed Naj ibullah. While the POPAdemise was regarded as inevitable, it was delayed
until 1992 as mujahidill allies against the Soviet occupation endeavored to agree to
a power-sharing agreement, without success. Following Afghan custom, they resumed fighting one another. 32 Continued fighting led to a civil war between the
various factions, collapse of the PDP A, and the replacement of the Najibullah government by one headed by President Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Islamic Council
of Afghanistan . Tribal fighting continued and lawlessness increased, leading to
Taliban emergence in 1994}3 President Rabbani's departure in 1996 resulted in
collapse of the remaining limited central government infrastructure, leaving Afghanistan in the position of a failed State, existing in name only.34
Taliban characteristics and origins arguably can be traced to the Wahhabi sect
founded by Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century,3S but its
contemporary formation originated in 1994 in Pashtun-dominated southern Afghanistan .3/; The Taliban sought to "work with the deep social grain of rural conselVatism, not interfering with the power of tribal elders and landowners, as long as
the people followed Taliban religious practices."17 Its inability to gain international
recognition, discussed infra, lay in part in the philosophy of its leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, who departed from Afghanistan's traditional international role,
expressing indifference with respect to international relations and foreign policy
and their necessity for Afghanistan. 38 Equally important, Loyn obselVes,
[alt the core of the new antimatter soul being formed for Afghanistan was "antieducation", in which boys were taught nol about culture or the natural world, and
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certainly not to think for themselves---the bedrock of education in the developed
world---but to believe that this was all taken care of for them by Islam.
The madrassas became factories turning out Taliban fighters, many of them war
orphans who knew no other life. "Talib" simply means "student", although the word
came to mean specifically "religious student", and the madrassa system provided a
formidable old-boy network, giving a sinuous strength and flexibility to the Taliban
army, which otherwise ltuked a lamia/ command strudure.39
In the battles of the mid- to late 1990s, momentum ebbed to and fro and, in
Afghan tradition, tribal warlords and individual tribes switched sides frequently.
Personnel replacements for Taliban lost in battle or through defections to antiTaliban forces were drawn from volunteers from tribal areas in Pakistan and nonAfghan volunteers.4o Efforts in 1996 by the Pakistani interior minister to have the
Taliban join in consolidated opposition to the Northern Alliance were rebuffed by
Taliban leader Mullah Omar. As a result, when the Taliban eventually recaptured
the Afghan capital of Kabul on Septem ber 26, 1996, "they had few friends, and
never secured the international recognition they craved."41
Taliban recapture of Kabul did not bring formal recognition from its primary financial backers, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It did result in a new warlord alliance
called the "Supreme Council fo r the Defence of the Motherland" to oppose the
Taliban. 42 The following spring the Taliban began its advance north. Concentration of agriculture, industry, mineral and gas resources in northern Afghanistan
made a Taliban offensive critical to its consolidation ofpower.H Political leaders in
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia agreed they would extend formal recognition to the
Taliban as the government of Afghanistan when and if it controlled the entire
country, then advanced recognition following Taliban seizure ofthe Northern Alliance city of Mazar-i-Sharif on May 24, 1997, optimistically but incorrectly concluding control of the entire country would follow soon thereafter.
In a set of circumstances reflecting the Byzantine nature of the Pakistani government and despite the fact that Is m agency Chief of Staff Ahmed Badeeb acknowledged that the Taliban "had no clue how to run a country,"44 at ISlD urging
the Pakistani foreign ministry announced Pakistan's recognition of the Taliban as
the government of Afghanistan on May 25, 1997, a decision Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif learned of from a television news announcement. His aide recalled Sharif was "furious,» wondering out loud who had made a decision that was
his to make. 4s
The ISm , heavily invested in the Taliban in part to provide a safe haven for Pakistan's insurgency operations in Kashmir,46 pressed Saudi Arabia to join it in recognition of the Taliban. "Due to Pakistani [ISID ] insistence and to the lack of any
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other options so as to fill the obvious vacuum" in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia followed suit the next day.47The United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose leadership enjoyed special hunting privileges in Pakistan and Taliban-controlled western
Afghanistan, recognized the Taliban two days later. 48
These announcements were premature. Taliban seizure of Mazar-i-Sharif
lasted only hours following Pakistan's recognition announcement,49 and became a
deathtrap for Taliban forces. Mazar-i-Sharirs UzbekJShia population, joining
forces with the Northern Alliance, killed three hundred Taliban and captured another thousand. Taliban killed or captured included its top ten leaders in the assault on Mazar-i-Sharif. so Anti-Taliban forces increased in strength as warlords
switched sides in an anti-Taliban offensive that killed, captured, or wounded another six thousand Taliban, including 250 Pakistani fighters killed and another
550 captured. The Taliban swiftly retreated toward Kabul, en route destroying
crops and poisoning wells,sl relinquishing any claim to control of northern Afghanistan. The civil war intensified as aid and support to anti-Taliban forces increased from Iran, Turkey, India, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. 52
Nonetheless, and bolstered by the premature recognition by Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE, the Taliban sought US recognition. The Clinton administration declined. Following a confrontation between pro- and anti-Taliban factions
within the Afghanistan embassy in Washington in August 1997, the State Department ordered the embassy dosed, informing its representatives that "[a]s far as the
United States was concerned, Afghanistan's existence as a government in the international system had been suspended."53 No other nation joined Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and the UAE in their recognition of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. Taliban efforts to gain UN recognition were equally unsuccessful,54 in
large measure due to its ignorance of "U.N. procedures and even the U.N. Charter"
and its own counterproductive actions against UN agencies attempting to provide
humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, such as the High Commissioner for Refugees and
the World Food Program. An increase in funding by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for
the Taliban and drafts ofyoungjihadists from tribal areas in Pakistan enabled the
Taliban to reconstitute its fo rces and in 1998 commence another attack into northern Afghanistan, including a renewed effort to capture Mazar-i-Sharif. While militarily successful, international antipathy toward the Taliban increased owing to
Taliban actions against UN officials and non-government organizations; massacres of Uzbek, Tajik and Hazaras civilians in Mazar-i-Sharif; murder of captured
opposing-force fighters;S5 and the murder of eleven Iranian diplomats taken from
the Iranian consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif.56
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The Taliban had become an international par iah. Its status was exacerbated by
the al-Qaeda attack on US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, killing 213 civilians in the former and eleven in the latter,
and wounding more than fo ur thousand civilians in the two attacksY The US response included a cruise-missile attack on the suspected al-Qaeda training camp at
Zawhar Kili o n August 20, 1998 S8 and an end of any further argument of pragmatism toward the Taliban within the State Department. s9 International outrage increased with the Taliban's September 18, 1998 destruction of the two thousandyear-old Buddha statues in Bamiyan.60 The murder of the Iranian diplomats led to
Iran moving a military force of two hundred thousand to its border with Afghanistan; a meeting between Taliban leader Mullah Omar and UN envoy Lakhdar
Brahimi in Kandahar on October 14, 1998; a strong UN Security Council resolution threatening and eventually imposing international sanctions against the
Taliban;61 and Saudi Arabia's withdrawal of its diplomatic representation in Kabul
and its termination of official funding to the Taliban because of its protection of alQaeda leader Usama bin Laden. 62 Additional UN Security Council resolutions
condemning the Taliban and imposing sanctions followed through 1999,2000 and
into 2001 prior to the September 11 al-Qaeda attack on the United States as the $ecurityCouncil "remain [ed ] seized" with the matter.63 By 2000, Taliban support fo r
Islam ic fundamentalist groups from Central Asia, Iran, Kashmir, China and Pakistan had led to its further international isolation, increased support toanti-Taliban
forces64 and increasing signs of the Taliban's weakening grip on territory within
Afghanistan.6s Reports by the United Nations Secretary-General in Apr il and July
2001 requested by the General Assembly and Security Council, respectively, are revealing in their conclusions as to the Taliban's failures to act in any way as a governing authority within Afghanistan.66
Throughout the period in which the UN Security Council and the SecretaryGeneral weighed or took actions against the Taliban, at no time did either refer to
or suggest recognition of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan. 67
The al-Qaeda attacks in the United States on September II, 2001 brought a
rapid military response by the United States, acting under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1368,66 and concurrent political reactions by the three
nations previously aligned with the Taliban. The United Arab Emirates withdrew
its recognition of the Taliban on September 22; Saudi Arabia, three days later; and
Pakistan on November 22.
As previously noted, US offensive ground fo rce operations against the Taliban
and al-Qaeda formally commenced o n the evening of October 19-20,2001, with
insertion of two US Army Special Forces detachments.69 In less than two months,
Taliban and al -Qaeda resistance had collapsed. Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda
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fled into Pakistan .70 Taliban leader Mullah Omar survived, and fighting would
continue, but the Taliban as a viable entity had disintegrated.7 1

Was the Ta liban Entitled Legally to Recognition as the
Government of Afghanistan?
The actions of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are illustrative
of political recognition of a nation or a new government. But recognition by three
nations out of the 185 members of the United Nations does not warrant the conclusion that the Taliban constituted the de facto much less the de jure government
of Afghanistan for the following reasons:
• The Taliban was a faction in a civil war in a failed State, that is, a State in
which no central authority existed capable of carrying out the duties and
responsibilities of a national government to its citizens.
As established in the preceding pages, the Taliban
• Had no organized, uniformed military, no strategic military plans, and
no fonnal command and control structure characteristic of a regular military;
• Consisted of tribal forces with little to no formal military instruction;72
• Was composed of individuals loosely organized along tribal lines who
rotated between civilian (tribal or family) obligations and serving as fighters
on a daily or seasonal basis; and
• Lacked the capadty to fulfill traditional responsibilities of a government,
such as providing essential services (security, welfare and representation) to
the people of Afghanistan.
The United Nations, the European Union and 181 of the 185 nations
declined to recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan.
• The Afghanistan seat in the United Nations remained reserved for the
government of Burhanuddin Rabbani which for all intents and purposes ceased to
exist in 1994.
• The civil war did not end with the Taliban as a dear victor occupying, much
less controlling, Afghanistan . At the time of commencement of US and coalition
operations on October 20, 2001, the civil war continued, and Taliban power had
eroded significantly.
• As the 200 1 Secretary-General's report observed, the Taliban was unable to
consolidate its military successes outside the predominately Pashtun southern
Afghanistan region from which it originated.
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The Taliban refused to acknowledge Afghanistan's pre-existing international
obligations, such as those of being a member of the United Nations, or through its
actions as a State party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 73
International law requirements for existence as a State are historic:
First, there must be a people....
Second, there must be a fIXed territory which the inhabitants occupy. .
Third, there must be an organized government exercising control over, and
endeavoring to maintain justice within, the territory.
Fourthly, there must be capacity to enter into relations with the outside world.
Fifthly, the inhabitants of the territory must have attained a degree of civilization such
as to enable them to observe with respect to the outside world those principles of law
which are deemed to govern the members of the international society in their relations
with each other.14

The State of Afghanistan previously joined and was accepted into the community of nations as a member of the United Nations. Its ratification of the 1949
Geneva Conventions in 1956 was accepted by Switzerland, the depositary. No State
objected to its ratification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Hence it m ay be presumed that each State regarded Afghanistan as having m et statehood criteria one
and two. Were all other questions answered in the affirmative, a question would remain as to whether in its time as a failed State and with the ascendancy of the
Taliban it continued to meet the third, fourth and fifth criteria. The third criterion
does not say "exercise control over a substantial portion of' a nation's territory, or
suggest a percentage of territorial control as threshold criteria, but the territory as a
whole. As to "maintaining justice within the territol)'," Professors Goldman and
Tittemore acknowledge "the Taliban exercised few, ifany, ofthe traditional activities of government."7S This cannot be dismissed entirely as a chamcteristic of
Afghan culture; more likely it is affirmation of the fact that the resources for the
Taliban to govern were unavailable because they had been diverted to fighting the
contin uing civil war. In turning inward under the leadership of Mullah Omar, the
Taliban defaulted on the fourth. In the wholesale murder of foreign diplomats,
representatives of non-governmental organizations, its civilians because of different religious beliefs, and captured fighters-violations of human rights law and the
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law of war-there is no evidence the Taliban met the fi fth criterion essential to its
qualification as the government of Afghanistan.76
Assuming fo r sake of argument the five criteria couJd be met for the failed State
of Afghanistan to restore its place among its peers, there remains the question of
whether the Taliban itself became the rightful government of Afghanistan at any
time prior to its defeat and collapse in December 200 1. Changes internal to a nation are regarded as matters of domestic concern. n That said,
[il nasm uch. however, as the government of a State is the instrument through which it
has official contact with the outside world and undertakes to respond to official
obligations, a change of government and the methods by which it is wrought are
matters of concern to fo reign countries. They are concerned primarily with a question
of fact- whether the regime seeking recognition is in actual control of the reins of
government. No difficulty presents itself when a change is wrought thro ugh normal
processes and the result is accepted as a mere incident in the life or growth of the State
concerned. The situation may be obscure. however, when a contest for governmental
control is waged by force of arms or by other processes not contemplated by the local
law; the completeness of the success of a contestant may be fai rly open to do ubt fo r
a protracted period, and even after its adherents assume to exercise the functions of
a government. In such case foreign States may, and oftentimes do, withhold
recognition until they are themselves assured where the victory really lies. The
sufficiency of such assurance depends obviously upon the circumstances of the
particular case; and it may follow dose upon the heels of a coup d'etat. The matter is
unrelated to the mode whereby the success of a regime is achieved, except in so far as
recourse to a particular method may breed doubt as to the security or permanence of
the control that has been won?!

The decision as to whether or not to recognize a State, or a new government in a
State, resides in governments of other sovereign nations, and, within a government, with the executive branch of each.79
By analogy, the law of war provides a way in which to determine whether the
Taliban had gained de facto or de jure status. State A invades State B. In doing so,
its military forces physically seize a portion of State B's territory. Under the law of
belligerent occupation State A becomes an occupying power only when the territory State A's forces physically occupy "is actually placed under the authority of
the hostile army."80 Further, the occupation "extends only to the territory where
such authority has been established and can be exercised."81 A claimant must be
able to exercise effective control; that is, an occupying power must be in a position to enforce the authority he is asserting over the territory and meet the obligations of an occupying power, which includes governing and providing various
services (such as security and welfare ) to the civilian population necessary to meet
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its day-to-day requirements. tl2 Assuming this analogy is reasonable. the history of
the civil war between Taliban and anti-Taliban factions from 1994 to 2001 never
resulted in a situation in which the Taliban was able to enforce the authority it
may have asserted over the territory it physically occupied, much less all of Afghanistan. The Secretary-General's July 13, 200 1 report that "[aJ II regions of the
country, with the exception of the southern [Pashtun J region, now include active
conflict zones"8' confirms the conclusion that while the Taliban may have enjoyed a physical presence in a large portion of Afghanistan. it was unable to consolidate its military gains and exercise effective control over these areas, much less
establish the infrastructure to govern them. These are critical legal distinctions
that media reports failed to make.
The facts on the ground and international law do not support a conclusion that
the Taliban was the de facto, m uch less de jure. government of Afghanistan at any
time from its emergence in 1994 to October 20, 2001, when US and coalition military operations commenced against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.8-t

Combatant and Prisoner o/War Status and the Taliban and AI-Qaeda
Accepting arguendo the US position that its intervention in Afghanistan was an international armed conflict, entitlement to the combatant's privilege and, therefore.
prisoner of war status upon capture is determined by provisions contained in Article 4 ofthe Geneva Convention (1Il) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
of August 12. 1949 (hereinafter GPW).85 Relevant GPW provisions provide entitlement to humane treatment to captured individuals entitled to the combatant's

privilege.
Combatants are members of the established armed forces of a government who
have a legal right to engage in combat operations. Combatants enjoy "combatant
immunity" under international law, protecting them from prosecution for death
or injury to persons or damage or destruction of property resulting from combatant acts that otherwise comply with the law of war in an armed conflict.86 A
combatant

• Has the right to carry out lawful attacks on enemy military personnel and
military objectives;
• Is at risk of attack by enemy military forces at any time, wherever located.
regardless of the duties or activities in which he or she is engaged;
• Bears no criminal responsibility (a ) for killing or injuring (i) enemy military
personnel or (ii) civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, or (b ) for causing
damage or destruction to property incidental to lawful military operations.
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provided his or her acts, including the means employed to commit those acts, have
been in compliance with the law of war; and
If captured:
Is entitled to prisoner of war status,
May be detained indefinitely until cessation of active hostilities,
Is entitled to humane treatment,
May be tried for violations of the law of war, and
May only be punished for violations of the law of war as a result of a
fair and regular trial.
Limitations on entitlement to the combatant's privilege are historic and an essential component of the equally historic law of war principle of discrimination. Although the origins of the modern law of war can be traced to classical Greek and
Roman times, the Middle Ages provided its greatest development prior to the midnineteenth century. Today's law of war began as an amalgamation of the jus
mi/itaire, recognized military practice contained in rules of chivalry, and canon law
known as the just war tradition. 87 Both jus militaire and the just war tradition included a requirement for "public war," that is, war authorized by right (that is,
competent ) authority. In the jus mi/itaire, "public war" was the "antithesis of perfidy and cowardly assassinations, actions repugnant to the conception of chivalry
and the membership of the various knightly orders in which knights belonged. "sa
Individuals engaging in unauthorized acts of war were acting outside "'faith and the
law of nations." They were regarded as "marauders and freebooters," treated as war
criminals if captured, and usually summarily executed.89
Paralleling right authority was the principle of discrimination/noncombatant
(civilian ) immunity. In the conduct of military operations, commanders were obligated to exercise reasonable care to protect innocent civilians from the harmful
effects of combat operations. It also obligated combatants to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population, and obligated civilians not to engage in combatant acts.
Through the near century and a half of development of the modern law of war,
governments have retained exclusive authority to wage war for practical, political
and humanitarian reasons. First is the responsibility of a government to protect its
citizens. Second, a desire for stability in international relations necessitates a prohibition of unilateral acts by a civilian or civilians that may lead to war between nations. 90 Third, the prohibition on civilians engaging in combatant acts selVes to
implement and enforce the law of war principle of discrimination. 91 The private citizen who engages in battle is not entitled to the combatant's privilege and forfeits
his or her protection as a civilian from direct attack for such time as he or she takes
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a direct part in hostilities.'12 If captured, he or she is not entitled to prisoner of war
status and may be prosecuted for his or her actions.
Codification of the modern law of war and these distinctions originated in the
midst of the US Civil War (186 1--65). Dr. Francis Lieber, a Columbia College law
professor, offered to draft a document for the Union Army delineating in practical
terms existing law of war rules. President Lincoln accepted Lieber's offer. Signed by
President Lincoln on April 24, 1863, as US General Orders No. 100, Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field became the
primary source for treaty law developed over the next century.
Of direct relevance to the present discussion is a less-known product requested
of Professor Lieber. O n August6, 1862, Henry Wager Halleck, General-in-Chief of
the Union armies, wrote to Lieber seeking his advice and assistance in addressing
the issue of private citizens engaging in unauthorized acts of war and Union law of
war obligations toward captured Confederate guerrillas. General Halleck viewed
partisans and guerrillas as synonymous. Professor Lieber made a distinction between the two in his essay reply, "Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to
the Laws and Usages of War." Lieber argued that partisans enjoy a formal association with a government and its military forces (and entitlement to prisoner of war
status), while guerrillas were
self-constituted sets of armed men, in times of war, who form no integrant part of the
organized army, do not stand on the regular pay-roll of the army, or are not paid at all,
take up arms and lay them down at intervals, and carry on petty war (guerrilla) chiefly
by raids, extortion, destruction, and massacre, and who cannot encumber themselves
with many prisoners. and will therefore generally give no quarter. 93
While Lieber does not identify opposing forces that might have been illustrative
of each category, the Virginia cavalry unit commanded by Confederate Colonel
John S. Mosby94 is regarded as meeting Lieber's category of partisans, and therefore
lawful combatants, while William C. Quantrill's private group of raiders in
Missouri9s were guerrillas (as he used the term in his analysis), and, as such, not entitled to the combatant's privilege or prisoner of war status.96
Lieber maintained this distinction in General Orders No. 100. Article 57 states,
"[s]o soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath
of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses ... ," while acknowledging in Article 59 that "raj prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes committed against the captor's army
or people ... ." Article 81 of General Orders No. 100 states:
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Partisans are soldiers armed and wearing the uniform of their army, but belonging to a
corps which acts detached from the main body for the purpose of making inroads into
the territory occupied by the enemy. If captured, they are entitled to all the privileges of
the prisoner of wa r.

In contrast, Article 82 declares:
Men, or squads of men. who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads fo r
destruction or plunder. or by raids of any kind. without commission, without being
part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in
the war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or
with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting
themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers--such men, or squads of men,
are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of
prisoners of wa r, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.

Fratlc-tireur actions in the Franco-Prussian War and the debate over military
operations by Boer farme rs dressed in civilian clothing in the Anglo-Boer War
(1899-1902 ) brought the issue to international attention at the First International
Peace Conference, held in The Hague in 1899.
Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
was among the treaties adopted by the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. Article 3 of
its Annexed Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land states:
"The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and noncombatants."97 In case of capture by the enemy both have a right to be treated as
prisoners of war.
Following Professor Lieber's lead, recognition as armed forces was provided not
only to the regular forces of a belligerent but also to other forces in Article 1:
The laws, rights. and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible fo r his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in acco rdance with the laws and customs of war.
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In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or fonn a part of it,
they are included under the denomination "army."
En titlement to lawful comb atant and prisoner of war status for organizations
other than the regular forces of a nation was provisional. It was dependent upon
these fo rces actin g und er government authority an d complyin g strictly with the
four con ditions listed. Failure of complian ce resulted in den ial of the comb atant's
privilege. Individuals acting u nilaterally outsid e an organization were n o t entitled
to the combatan t's privilege.
Development o f railroads in the late nineteenth century facilita ted rapid deployment of m ilitary forces, prom pting fear by smaller n ations such as Belgium
and the Netherland s of threats posed by stronger powers such as France and Prussia. Article 2 of the Annex to the 1899 Hague II provided conditional combatant
status to what is referred to as a levee en masse, as follows:
The population of a territory which has not been occupied who, on the enemy's
approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having
time to organize themselves in accordance with Article I, shall be regarded as
belligerent, if they respect the laws and customs of war.
The Marten s C lause
The participating nations appreciated that Hague Convention II was a first effort at
international codification of the law of war for ground forces. Of particular importance to the topic of this ch apter is language con tain ed in the main treaty:
It has not ... been possible to agree forthwith on provisions embracing all the
circumstances which occur in practice. On the other hand, it could not be intended
by the High Contracting Parties that the cases not provided for should, for want of a
written provision, be left to the arbitrary judgment of the military commanders.
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by
them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of public
conscience.
This provision, referred to as the Martens Clause,1IS was the result of a deb ate
over the status of private citizens who took up arms follow ing en emy occupation.
Delegations representing m ajor European m ilitary powers argued that such individuals should be treated as unlawful combatants subject to summary execution if
captured. Smaller European nations argued that they sh ould b e regarded as lawful
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combatants as each citizen has a d uty to his nation to resist enemy presence. The
argument essentially was one for levee en masse ''plus, »a continuous resistance to
enemy occupation. In the end, private citizens who took up arms in resistance to
enemy occupation remained unprivileged combatants. 99 This prompted incorporation of the Martens ClauseYIO
These provisions were repeated verbatim or without substantive change in
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War o n Land adopted
by the Second International Peace Conference in The Hague, o n October 18,
1907.101
A h umanitarian basis existed for the decision taken by delegations to the two
Hague Peace Conferences. As one international lawyer commented:
The separation of armies and peaceful inhabitants into two distinct classes is perhaps
the greatest triumph of International Law. Its effect in mitigating the evils of war has
been incalculable .... But if populations have a war right as against armies, armies have
a strict right against them. They must not meddle with fighting. The citizen must be a
citizen and not a soldier. 102
The law of war principle of discrimination prohibits military forces from engaging in direct attack of innocent enemy civilians and the enemy civilian population
in general. In addition to obligating military forces to distinguish themselves physically and in appearance from the civilian population, the principle of discrimina tion obligates civilians to refrain from engaging in combatant acts, as such actions
may place the general civilian population at risk. That said, the Martens Clause acknowledged the existence of unspecified but minimum standards of protection
and humane treatment for unprivileged combatants upon capture. The Bush administration's express rejection of Common Article 3 application in US operations
in Afghanistan neglected to acknowledge that the United States, as a State party to
the 1907 Hague Convention IV, was bound by the Martens Clause in the 1907
Hague Convention IV. The Bush administration's focus solely on the last fo ur (of
six) criteria in Article 4A, paragraph 2, GPW, discussed infra, also neglected the
possible legal significance of the Martens Clause.

World War II
The 1939 invasion of major portions of Europe by Germany that began with the
German invasion of Poland o n September 2,1939, and of Asia by Japan following
its attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, eventually brought organized resistance against Axis occupation on a scale previously unseen. The resistance
movement within the Soviet Union was massive and well organized by the Soviet
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government. I03 The British Special Operations Executive (SO£ ) and US Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) provided organization, training, equipment and other
support to indigenous resistance movements in twenty nations under Axis control. IO( Resistance to enemy occupation argued for in 1899 by Belgium and other
smaller nations, all victims of German or Japanese occupation in World War II, became reality. The World War II resistance experience prompted revisitation of the
1899 debate regarding law of war recognition of a levee etl masse "plus" and a major
change at the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference in entitlement to combatant
and prisoner of war status.
1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference
The 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference met in 1949, completing (from drafts)
and adopting four conventions:
• Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949;105
• Geneva Convention (II ) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea;106
Geneva Convention (Ill) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar;I07
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War. 108
The Geneva Conventions are specific and exclusive in providing entitlement to
protection. Thus the first convention provides protection for military wounded
and sick and medical units, personnel, and transport, while the second convention
protects military wounded, sick and shipwrecked and their associated fac ilities,
units, and transport. Legal obligations with respect to protection of and care forcivilian sick or wounded, civilian medical facilities, and civilian medical transport
are not included. 109
Similarly, Article 4 of the GPW is specific in identifying and limiting individuals entitled to prisoner of war status, while the civilians convention is equally specific in identifying the circumstances in which civilians in enemy hands are
entitled to protection. The prisoner of war and civilians conventions did not provide all-encompassing, seamless entitlement to protection, but are quite specific
in their respective applications to particular individuals.
With respect to private civilians engaged in combat actions, the prisoner of war
convention is directly relevant to the topic at hand.
The criteria for prisoner of war entitlement were reconsidered in light of the
World War 11 experience with State-sponsored organized resistance movements.
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Paragraph 1 of Article 4A of the prisoner of war convention reconfirms entitlement
to prisoner of war status for members of the regular armed forces and militias or
volunteer corps of a government. 110 Paragraph 2 amended the criteria for combatant and prisoner of war status for groups not falling within paragraph 1:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, indudillg those of
organized resistance movemmts, belollgillg to a party to the collf/iet and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias
or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the
following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible fo r his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fIxed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war.I l l

The International Committee of the Red Cross's (JCRe) Jean S. Pictet acknowledges that recognition of entitlement to combatant and prisoner of war status for
State-sponsored resistance groups in enemy-occupied territory "was an important
innovation which grew out of the .. . Second World War."II! Fully cognizant of the
World War II resistance experience, government delegations to the 1949 diplomatic conference declined to expand protection to all private armed groups. The
historic criteria of righ t authority remained fundamental to entitlement to combatant and prisoner of war status.
A common mistake by lay persons, non-international law lawyers, some international law lawyers and, in the case at hand, by senior legal advisers and
policymakers in the Bush administration is to recite the four criteria in (a) through
(d) of Article 4A(2) as the criteria for any armed group to be eligible for combatant
and prisoner of war status. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of the law of
war and, in particular, of Article4A(2), GPW, and the rationale and history behind
it. Extension of combatant and prisoner of war status in Article 4A(2) is intentionally and expressly narrower. Combining Articles 2 and 4A(2), there are seven criteria, all of which must be met:
First, there must be an international armed conflict, that is, an armed conflict
between two or more nations.I13
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Second, the individual who falls into enemy hands after engagement in combatant activities must be a member of an organized resistance movement, that is, he or
she cannot be acting unilaterally or as a member of a levee en masse in which private
citizens respond spontaneously.ll~
Third, the organized resistance movement to which the individual belongs must
be operating under the authority and support of a government that is a party to the
conflict, that is, it must have right aut}lOnty. In World War II, this authority was
manifested through training, logistical, communications and other support, provided by governments-in-exile with the assistance of the British SOE and American
OSS, and military forces supporting them, such as with sealift and airlift for delivering supplies and agents, lIS as well as overtly through official pronouncements. 116
The preceding criteria are prerequisites before the four remaining criteria in Article 4A(2) are applicable. The first two criteria in Article 4A(2) are a threshold that
must be crossed before the last four can be considered. II? If an armed group meets
the threshold criteria, consideration must be given to whether or not the armed
group meets each and every one of the remaining criteria listed in Article 4A(2 ). I HI
The 1949 change entitled members of an organized resistance movement operating under the authority of a government-but only organized armed groups operating under government authority-to prisoner of war status. The requirement
for such movements to "conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war" confirmed the combatant's privilege and provided lawfuJ combatant status.
The change in entitlement reflected the experience of World War II resistance
movements while codifying the distinction between organized, State-sanctioned
partisans and private guerrillas made by Francis Lieber during the American Civil
War. Equally important, delegates to the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference declined to provide lawfuJ combatant or prisoner of war status to private citizens acting without government authority.
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (GC) by its title and the language of Common Article 2 applies only in an
international armed conflict between two or more nations. The GC filled a gap
(that is, protection for civilians in enemy hands, including in enemy-occupied territory). Article 5, paragraph 3, provides limited protection to a civilian "suspected
of or engaged in activities hostile to the State" in an international armed conflict as
it is defined in Article 2. Private citizens who engage in combatant-like actions
other than in occupied territory or enemy territory do not receive protection under
the Geneva civilians convention. This excludes transnational terrorists from protection under that treaty.
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Governments participating in the 1949 diplomatic conference did not intend
that the four 1949 Geneva Conventions provide a seamless "safety net" of protection for all persons, in particular private individuals or organizations who conduct
armed attacks without government authority. The negotiating record of the 1949
Geneva Conventions is clear that the conventions were not intended to and do not
provide protection to unprivileged belligerents. In the course of the 1949 diplomaticconference, the delegate representing the ICRC stated that "although the two
conventions might appear to cover all categories concerned, irregular belligerents
were not actually protected."1l9 Similarly, the representative of the United Kingdom stated "the whole conception of the . . . [Geneva civilians convention I was the
protection of civilian victims of war, and not the protection of illegitimate bearers
of arms."
In the development of the law of war from the mid-nineteenth century through
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, combatant status and prisoner of war protection was extended to members of a levee en masse (as noted, limited in scope and
time) and to organized resistance movements operating in enemy-occupied territory under the authority of a government provided each met rigid conditions for
distinguishing themselves from the civilian population and carrying out their operations in accordance with the law of war. In keeping with the centuries-old standards that originated in jus militaire and the just war tradition, governments
steadfastly have refused to provide legitimacy to or legal recognition for private
armed individuals or groups acting without government authority and responsibility. The historic condemnation of private armed groups remains through their
exclusion from combatant or prisoner of war status for the overall protection of the
civilian population. Governments over the centuries consistently have given
greater priority to the protection of their civilian populations and individual civilians over entitlement to prisoner of war status for private armed groups, in part to
dissuade private citizens from taking up arms and waging war without government
authority and in respect for the law of war principle of discrimination.
With this history in mind, the status of members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda
may be weighed.
Al-Qaeda
The history of Afghanistan and the fighting in the two decades prior to al-Qaeda's
attack on the United States on September II, 2001 focused on the Taliban. AlQaeda's history within Afghanistan and overall is loosely intertwined with the
Taliban. Al-Qaeda was founded by Usama bin Laden,scion ofa wealthy Saudi family, in protest against Saudi Arabia's consent to US bases in Saudi Arabia in the
buildup to, and execution of, the 1991 coalition liberation of Kuwait from iraq.120
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Bin Laden , a veteran of the mujahidin battles of the 1980s against Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan, arrived in Jalalabad,Afgh anistan , on May 18, 1996, an area not under Taliban control and without invitation from the Taliban.l2l He had an agenda
separate from, and broader than, the Taliban's battle within Afghanistan: a transnational jihad against the West and, in particular, the United States.
An extended discussion ofUsama bin Laden and al-Qaeda's activities is unnecessary. Professors Goldman and T ittemore describe al-Qaeda as "a quintessential
non-State actor," stating, "President [Bush ] and Defense Secretary [Rumsfeld [ are
unquestionably correct in their depiction of al-Qaeda as an international terrorist
organization."122 Professor Toman agrees with Professors Goldman and Tittemore
with respect to their first conclusion, declaring, "On the basis of this very short
practical analysis, we can easily conclude, that al-Qaeda members cannot benefitin any circumstances-from the status of prisoners of war." Nor does a law of war
basis exist for al-Qaeda members to enjoy the combatant's privilege. 123
The Taliban
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva prisoner of war convention identifies persons entitled
to prisoner of war status. Prisoner of war entitlement differs from combatant status, the latter being narrower in scope. 124
The preceding pages establish that the Taliban was not the government of Afghanistan. That said, it is necessary to review the relevant provisions in Article 4 to
determine whether captured Taliban are entitled to prisoner of war status. 125
Articfe4A(1)
Article 4A( 1) provides prisoner of war status to "[m[embers of the armed forces of
a Party to the conllict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming
part of such armed forces. "
In the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the term "Party to the conllict" means a
"Contracting Party" or "High Contracting Party," in each case referring to a government that has ratified or acceded to the conventions. As noted in the JCRC
Commentary,
Each State contracts obligations vis-a-vis itself and at the same time vis-a-vis the others.
The motive ofthe Convention isso essential for the maintenance of civilization that the
need is felt for its assertion, as much out of respect for it on the part of the signatory
Sta te itself as in the expectation of such respect from all parties. l 26

As only governments may contract on behalf of a nation or, said differently,
only governments may agree to become parties to the conventions, the term
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"Party to a conflict" refers to an armed conflict between the military forces of two
or more nations. An armed private group may choose to participate in an international armed conflict on one side or another, but its participation does not
make it a "Party to the conflict" in the sense that phrase is used in the 1949
Geneva Conventions.127
In the same vein, the term "armed forces" refers to "all members of the regular
armed forces of a nation,"121! to include members of its reserve or militia forces. It is
left up to each government to determine how its military is to be composed. In the
United States, this includes the reserve component of each of its four military services and the National Guard when the latter have been activated by the President.
The term "militia" in Article 4A( 1) does not refer to private armed groups.
As the Taliban was not the government of Afghanistan in fact or in law, it was
not a "Party to the conflict" as that term is used in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Nor were the Taliban part of the military of Afghanistan, as it no longer existed.
Neither a national government (other than perhaps in name only with respect to
the Rabbani government) nor a national military force existed during the period in
question.
Two issues arose in the debate over the Taliban and its status. As noted in the
factual summary, the Taliban did not have the formal unit structure of a Western
army. Similarly, some Taliban fighters ("non-Afghan Taliban") were from Pakistani tribes, while other figh ters came from other nations. Were this a case in which
the Taliban had been the government of Afghanistan and its military the regular
military of Afghanistan, and therefore members of its forces falling under Article
4A( I), neither issue would have been a basis for denial of entitlement to prisoner of
war status. Other than in the most general terms, such as command responsibility,
the GPW does not specify force structure requirements. Further, the GPW is silent
and State practice extensive with respect to the national origin of a member of the
regular military forces . For example, US citizens joined British Commonwealth
military forces and served in World Wars J1 29 and lI,J3o and the US military routinely enlists foreign nationals residing in the United States in its armed forces, often through the enticement of US citizenship following completion of a successful
initial enlistment toUr. 131 While Pakistan covertly supplied the Taliban with arms
and ammunition and other support during the 1994-2001 Afghan civil war, and to
a degree facilitated the movement of Pakistani tribesmen to join the Taliban, it was
not an acknowledged party to the conflict in Afghanistan. As such, Pakistani and
other non-Afghans who joined the Taliban were entitled to no greater status under
the law of war than were Afghan members of the Taliban.
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Article 4A(2)
As noted earlier, Article 4A(2), GPW, was an outgrowth of the World War II experience of organized resistance movements operating under the authority and
with the support of the former governments of nations under Axis control. 132 It
does not provide entitlement to prisoner of war status to all private armed
groups, but only to those operating with government authority. In this respect it
repeated the formula articulated by Dr. Francis Lieber in his 1863 "Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages ofWar,"tn and proposed
in the form of an extended levee en masse at the First Hague Peace Conference in
1899 by Belgium and other smaller military powers, without success.l:M The
World War II government-sanctioned resistance movement experience prompted
reconsideration of the issue and a guarded and highly conditioned broadening of
entitlement to prisoner of war status only to organized anned groups acting under
government authority.
Assuming arguendo that there was an international armed confli ct upon commencement of US and coalition offensive ground operations against the Taliban
and al-Qaeda on October 20, 200 1, the Taliban did not meet the six criteria in Article 4A(2). Arguably it was an organized armed group, but loosely organized
along tribal lines. Prior to commencement of US and coalition military operations, the Taliban had been financially and to some extent logistically supported
by the Pakistan Ism and Saudi Arabia in the civil war in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia had withdrawn its support and Pakistan withdrew support.135 As noted, neither was a "Party to the conflict" in the Afghan civil war. The Taliban were not
entitled to prisoner of war status under Article4A(2), as it failed to meet all sixcriteria therein.
Article4A(3)
Article 4A(3) entitles "[ m Jembers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance
to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power" to prisoner of war status and entitlement.
This provision, new in the 1949 Convention, was based upon the experience of
World War II, as members of the armed forces of nations conquered and occupied
by Germany continued the fight under their respective governments-in-exile. l.36
Jean S. Pictet, in the Commentary on the GPW he edited on behalf of the International Committee of the Red Cross, makes it dear that the point of reference for
Article 4A(3 ) was the Free French: "This provision must be interpreted, in the first
place, in the light of the actual case which motivated its drafting-that of the forces
of General de Gaulle which were under the authority of the Free French National
Liberation Committee."137
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Pictet continues:
The expression "members of the regular armed force" denotes armed forces which
differ from those referred to in subparagraph ( 1) of this paragraph[llII] in one respect
only: the authority to which they profess allegiance is not recognized by the adversary
as a Party to the conflict. These "regular armed forces" have all the material
characteristics of armed forces in the sense of subparagraph 0 ): they wear uniform[s],
they have an organized hierarchy and they know and respect the laws and customs of
war. The ddegates to the 1949 Diplomatic Conference were therefore fully justified in
considering that there was no need to specify for such armed fo rces the requirements
stated in subparagraphs (2) (a), (b), (cl, and (d).[o 9]
The distinguishing feature of such armed forces is simply the fact that in view of their
adversary, they were not operating or are no longer operating under the direct
autho ri tyofa Party to the conflict in accordance with Article 2 of the Convention. [140]
One solution in order to bring these armed forces legally within the scope of the
Convention was to associate them with a belligerent fighting against the Power
concerned. During the Second World War the German authorities accepted this
solution and stated they would consider the Free French Forces to be "fighting for
England". The conference of Government Experts also supported this solution. [l ~1 J
Another procedure which was proposed by the [ICRC] was that the forces should be
recognized provided they were constituted in a regular manner "irrespective of the
Government or authority under whose orders they might claim to be." In order to
preclude any abusive interpretation which might have led to the fo rmation of armed
bands such as the "Great Companies" of baneful memory,[ 1~ 2] the drafters of the 1949
Convention specified that such armed forces must "profess allegiance to a Government
or authority not recognized by the Detaining Power." It must be expressly stated that
this Government or autho rity must. as a minimum requirement. be recognized by
third States. but this condition is consistent with the spirit of the provision. which was
founded on the specific case of the forces of General de Gaulle.
It is also necessary that this authority, which was not recognized by the adversary,
should either consider itself as representing one of the High Contracting Parties, or
declare that it accepts the obligations stipulated in the Convention and wishes to apply
them . I ~3

The Taliban did not meet the criteria contained in Article 4A(3) inasmuch as it
was never the de jure government of Afghanistan. Throughout the Taliban era and
the period in question. the government of Afghanistan recognized by the United
Nations. the United States and by all nations other than Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates was that of Burhanuddin Rabbani. l44 His regime retained
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"title" to the Afghanistan seat in the United Nations throughout the ensuing events
in Afghanistan set forth in this article. As previously noted, Saudi Arabia, the UAE
and Pakistan withdrew their recognition of the Taliban as the United States and its
coalition partners commenced military operations in Afghanistan.
A distinction exists between the "Free French" case as envisioned by Article
4A (3), GPW, and the situation in Afghanistan. For Article4A(3) to have applied to
captured Taliban, the Taliban at some point wowd have had to have been the de
jure government of Afghanistan, a status it never achieved.
Article 4A(6)
Article 2 of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV entitled citizens "who, on
the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up anns to resist the invading
troops without having had time to organize themselves" into regwar armed forces
to status as a levee etI masse and to prisoner of war status if captured provided its
members "carried their arms openly" and respected the law of war. Article 4A(6),
GPW, reconfirmed the Hague provision, though Pictet acknowledges that a levee
en masse "almost never occurred during the Second World War."145 Entitlement
to levee en masse exists only in territory not under enemy occupation. Pictet also
notes that a levee en masse "can only be considered to exist during a very short period of time, that is, during the actual invasion period."146 Thereafter, such individuals are entitled to prisoner of war status only if they meet the six criteria in
Article 4A(2), GPW.147
The Taliban, however loosely structured, was an armed faction engaged in a
civil war with other warlords or factions. Its resistance to the initial US/coalition assawt would not have been a spontaneous, informal taking up of arms by individual
private citizens of the sort contemplated by the language either of the 1907 Hague
Convention or the 1949 GPW.

Special Operations Forces in Non-Standard Uniforms
Entry of US and allied SOP into Afghanistan in October 200 1 brought to the fore
the law of war issue of dress of some SOF in indigenous attire. It is a matter this author examined at length,1411 but which by necessity must be addressed briefly here.
In addition to the legal issue as such, it exposes an inconsistency in the Bush administration's arguments for denial of prisoner of war status to captured Taliban.
US and allied SOP were members of the regwar forces of their nations and, consistent with Article 4A(I), GPW, entitled to prisoner of war status if captured by
military forces of an enemy nation. The entitlement to prisoner of war status of individuals who fall within Article 4A(i ) is absolute; it is not conditional, as is the
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case with militia and organized resistance endeavoring to gain prisoner of war entitlement under Article 4A(2), GPW.149
As noted, governments involved in drafting the 1949 GPW were fully cognizant
ofthe World War II resistance experience. It was the basis for broadening the protection contained in Article I, Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV and Article I, paragraph I, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of July 27, 1929,150 to include members of State-sponsored organized resistance movements as individuals entitled to prisoner of war status provided they
met the four criteria contained in each of those treaties and in Article 4A(2) of the
1949 GPW. Had governments in 1899, 1907, 1929 or 1949 regarded the wearing of
a uniform a prerequisite for captured regular forces' entitlement to prisoner of
war status, it would not have been difficult to have said so. They did not. 151 That
said, a general asswnption exists that members of a State's armed forces (as that
term is used in the GPW), including SOF, will meet the four criteria contained in
Article 4A(2) in their operations. In practical terms, this has been accomplished by
regular forces, including SOF.IS2
A distinction exists, however, between the requirement in Article 4A(2)(b) to
have a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" and an assumption that
regular forces, including SOF, must wear full uniforms in order to remain entitled
to prisoner of war status. This distinction is not supported by treaty text or State
practice, as this author has shown. lS3
Several problems arise with an assumption that uniforms are required for entitlement to prisoner of war status: (a) no such requirement exists in the 1899
Hague Convention II, 1907 Hague Convention IV, 1929 GPW, nor in the 1949
GPW; (b) the term "uniform" is not used in any ofthese treaties;l S4 (c) "uniform"
is undefined in the law ofwar;I ;; and (d) requiring SOF to wear a complete uniform would impose upon them a higher standard than that imposed upon members of an organized resistance movement entitled to prisoner of war status under
Article 4A(2), GPW.
The issue was clarified in the diplomatic history of the 1974-77 diplomatic conference that produced the 1977 Additional Protocol I and II. The criteria for combatant and prisoner of war status were re1axed in Articles 43( 1) and 44 (3), for nonState actors in conflicts ofthe type defined in Article 1(4). As neither the United
States nor Afghanistan is a party to Additional Protocols I and II, these provisions
are not directly germane to the issue at hand. However, Article44(7) and its legislative history are. Article 44(7) states "[t ]his Article is not intended to change the
generally accepted practice of States with respect to the wearing of the uniform by
combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a Party to the
conflict."
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An authoritative commentary on this provision, prepared by individuals directly involved in its drafting and negotiation, explains the m eaning of this
provision:
Within the Working Group the initial enthusiasm for a single standard applicable both
to regular and independent armed forces was dampened when concern was expressed
that the [new] rules . .. might encourage uniformed regular forces to dress in civilian
clothing. . . . Accordingly, para. 7 was developed to [overcome this concern] .. . . The
report of the Working Group, however, states that "regulars who are assigned to tasks
where they must wear civilian clothes, as may be the case ... with advisers assigned to
certain resistance units, are not required to wear the uniform." The implication of para.
7, construed in the light of the Working Group report is that uniforms continue to be
the principal means by which members of regular uniformed units distinguish
themselves from the civilian population ... but that members of regular armed forces
assigned or attached to duty with the forces of resistance or liberation movements may
conform to the manner in which such irregulars conform to the requirements of para. 3. 156
The situation US and other coalition SOF faced upon entry into Afghanistan
was not new. Special operations forces working with indigenous resistance forces
frequently find them selves singled out as high-value targets by opposing forces. IS?
With the precedent of the consequences of the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, following
which US fo rces were withdrawn from Somalia, and fearing a similar withdrawal in
the event of US casualties, Northern Alliance warlords insisted on US and other
SOP wearing indigenous attire in the opening phase of operations against al-Qaeda
and the Taliban so they would blend in with the forces with whom they served. 1$8
O pposing sides generally had no difficulty identifying o ne another as fighters.ls9
The issue at hand with respect to al-Qaeda, the Taliban and coalition SOF in
Northern Alliance dress was twofold: first, whether they met any of the criteria in
Article 4, GPW, for entitlement to prisoner of war status, and second, if they were
lawful combatants, whether they engaged in " treacherous killing," prohibited by
Article 23(e), Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV,I60 and o therwise referred
to as perfidy. In the case at hand the prohibition on perfidy is defined in part in Article 37,1977 Additional Protocol I, as follows :
1. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts
inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or
is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The
following acts are examples of perfidy:
(c) the feigning of civilian or non-combatant status .. .
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With the exception of acts by individual members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban,
perfidy was not an issue in the course of the operations during the time frame in
question. As noted, both sides readily identified opposing forces.
President Bush's Decision
On February 7, 2002, President George W. Bush signed a memorandum to the Vice
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Director of
Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others concerning
humane treatment of a1 Qaeda and Taliban detainees. 16 2 The memorandum, by acknowledgment based upon a legal opinion rendered by the Attorney General,
concluded:
1. None of the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions apply to "our

conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world
because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a High Contracting
Party."
2. While the Attorney General advised the President that he has the
constitutional authority to "suspend [sic] Geneva as between the United
States and Afghanistan," President Bush declined to do so with respect to
the conflict with the Taliban.
3. The conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban was an international armed
conflict in which Common Article 3 to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions (non-international armed conflicts) did not apply.
4. Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants. Neither Taliban nor alQaeda detainees are entitled to prisoner of war status.
5. Detainees will be treated "humanely and, to the extent appropriate and
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the
principles of Geneva."
The President's decision was preceded by considerable interagency debate, primarily between the Departments of Justice and State. 163 Professors Goldman,
Tittemore and Toman provide analyses of the President's decision and details of
the views taken within the executive b ranch to the extent they were available at the
time each article was written.l64 The details of the debate are worthy of separate
analysis beyond the scope of this article and, moreover, have been resolved more by
decisions of the US Supreme Court since February 7, 2002, than by the President's
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February 7 memorand um.16s It is sufficient to note that the Department of Justice
and the Attorney General aggressively sought suspension of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, while the Secretary of State argued for a decision consistent with longstanding US practice of providing humane t reatment to individuals captured on
the battlefield consistent with the GPW, even where an individual's precise status
may not always be clear. 166
In the debate between the Departments of Justice and State over the law of war
status of captured Taliban, disagreements over facts played a large role. When Justice Departm ent officials offered as o ne option the conclusion that Afghanistan
was a failed State,I67 Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's response did not disagree,
but contained an attachment with a diplomatically obscure and factually evasive
rebuttal that "any determination that Afghanistan is a failed State would be contrary to the official US governm ent positio n. The United States and the international community have consistently held Afghanistan to its treaty obligations and
identified it as a party to the Geneva Conventions."I6/! Similarly, White House
Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales argued that "[tJhe argum ent that the United States
has never determined that GPW did not apply is incorrect. In at least one case
(Panama in 1989) the United States determined that GPW did not apply even
though it determined for policy reasons to adhere to the convention ."I69 This assertion was incorrect as the US position d uring Operation Just Cause was that Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions applied at a minimum.
Panamanian Defense Forces capt ured during Operation Just Cause were provided
prisoner of war protections pending for mal determinatio n by individual Article 5,
GPW, tribunals, if deemed necessary. 170
A memorandum prepared by the late Edward R. Cummings, a senior and highly
respected Department of State lawyer with extensive law of war experience, notes
that his consultations determined that "[tJhe lawyers involved [Departm ents of
Justice, State, and Defense, White Ho use Counsel, Office of the Vice President, and
Legal Counsel to the Chairman, loint Chiefs] all agree that al Qaeda or Taliban soldiers are presumptively no t POWs [prisoners ofwar J."171 However, it emphasized
that Departm ent of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of State
lawyers believe that, in the unlikely event that "do ubt should arise" as to whether a
particular detainee does not qualify fo r POW status, we should be prepared to offer
additional screening on a case-by-case basis, either pursuant to Article 5 ofGPW (to the
extent the convention applies) o r consistent with Article 5 (to the extent it does not).172

The mem orand um no tes that lawyers at the Department of Justice, White House
Counsel and Office of the Vice President did not agree.
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The President's decision attempted to split the difference, but in a way that was
less politically and legally defensible than had the law been strictly applied, as has
been the long-standing practice of the United States in armed conflicts in which
captured enemy personnel may not have met the criteria contained in Article 4,
GPW, for entitlement to prisoner of war status.
Public statements offering a rationale for President Bush's decision contained a
flawed law of war analysis. On February 7, 2002, the following White House announcement explained the legal basis for President Bush's decision:
The President has dete rmined that the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban
detainees, but not to the al Qaeda detainees.
Al Qaeda is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group.
As such, its members are not entitled to POW status.
Although we never recognized the Taliban as the legitimate Mghan government,
Mghanistan is a party to the Convention, and the President has determined that the
Taliban are covered by the Convention. Under the terms of the Geneva Convention,
however, the Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs.
Therefore, neither the Taliban nor al Qaeda detainees are entitled to POW status. 173

At a White House press briefing that same day, White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer stated:
[TJhe national security team . .. has a1way& said that these detainees should not be
treated as prisoners of war, because they don't conform to the requirements of Article 4
of the Geneva Convention, which detailed what type of treatment would be given to
people in accordance with POW standards. That's a very easily understood legal
doctrine of Article 4. For example, the detainees in Guantanamo did not wear
uniforms. They're not visibly identifiable. They don't belong to a military hierarchy.
All of those are prerequisites under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention, which will be
required in order to determine somebody is a POWP'

The following day Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld repeated
Fleischman's comment, stating the GPW "requires soldiers to wear uniforms that
distinguish them from the civilian population."17S Continuing, he stated, "The
Taliban did not wear distinctive signs, insignias, symbols or uniforms. To the contrary, far from seeking to distinguish themselves from the civilian population of
Afghanistan, they sought to blend in with civilian non-combatants, hiding in
mosques and populated areas."176
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The Fleischer and Rumsfeld statements contain two fundamental discrepancies.
First, each fails to articulate the primary threshold for entitlement to prisoner of
war status: al-Qaeda and the Taliban were private armed groups lacking any authorization or support from a State party to the armed conflict. Failing this, the four
criteria cited by Fleischer and Rumsfeld are not relevant; they and the balance of
the GPW do not apply to al-Qaeda, the Taliban or any other armed private group.
As explained, the concept of right authority dates back more than eight centuries; it
is expressly stated in Article 4A(2), GPW; yet it is missing from the Gonzales memorandum to President Bush, the Bush memorandum, and the Fleischer and
Rumsfeld statements. The key element (righ t autllOrity) was completely missed or
ignored in the official decision-making process and explanations of the Bush
administration.
Second, emphasis on captured al-Qaeda and Taliban not wearing a "uniform"
not only was factually incorrect, but ignored the fact that US forces fought alongside anti-Taliban forces who also did not wear a "uniform" in the Western European tradition. 171 Moreover, the term "uniform" is not the prerequisite in Article
4A(2), GPW, which is "having a flXed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance."
As previously noted, "uniform" is neither used nor defined in the relevant law of
war treatiesYs The distinctive apparel worn by Taliban and anti-Taliban forces
and, in the case of the latter, by some US special operations forces working with
them, met the "distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" test contained in Article
4A (2).179
Finally, in emphasizing the erroneous "uniform" test while ignoring the "organized resistance movement of a Party to the conflict" requirement, Fleischer and
Rumsfeld not only ran afoul of the treaty provision but appeared to suggest that alQaeda and the Taliban represented the government of Afghanistan, contrary to the
President's decision that "[ bIY its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts involving
'High Contracting Parties,' which can only be states." This inconsistency was not
missed by critics of the administration's approach to law of war application with
respect to captured members of these two organizations. 180 Whether one agrees or
disagrees with President Bush's decision, these statements were an incredible
stumble given the degree to which this issue was discussed within the executive
branch prior to the President's February 7 decision.
President Bush's principal conclusion that neither al-Qaeda nor the Taliban was
entitled to combatant or prisoner of war status was legally correct, but its supporting statements were contradictory and factually and legally incorrect, as follows:
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Bush administration rationale for denial
of prisoner of war status to captured alQaeda and Taliban

Fact ual or legal discrepancy, o r contradictory statements or actions by the Bush
administration

"The President has determined that the
[GPW [ applies to the Taliban detainees, but
not to the al-Qaida detainees.~L"

Legally incorrect and contradictory. As
noted in subsequent statements and the six
conditions contained in Article 4A(2 ),
GPW, captured Taliban were not entitled to
prisoner of war status. Therefore GPW did
not apply to Taliban detainees.

"[Tjhe President has determined that the
Taliban are covered by the [GPW] ....
[H]owever, the Taliban detainees do not
qualify as POWs. ~I "

Inconsistent with the President's statement
that "[b ]y its terms, [GPW] applies to conflicts involving 'High Contracting Parties,'
which can only be states."
Inconsistent with statement 3 (below).
US followed GPW asa manero(policy in
pasl conflicts where status of captured individ uals was undetermined. The Bush administration did not continue this practice,
resisting application of Common Article 3
humane treatment provisions until mandated by US Supreme Court.'"

U

AI Qaeda is not a High Contracting

Party. ~I"

uAI Qaeda is not a state party to the [GPW];
it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its
members are not entitled to POW status. ~I",

Legally vague and inaccurate. It would have
been more accurate to say "al.Qaeda is a
private armed group that meets none of the
GPW categories for POW status."

uUnder the terms ofthe [GPW], neither the
Taliban nor al·Qaida detainees are entitled
to POW status.~'·

Inconsistent with first statement (above)
that "GPW applies to Taliban detainees."
GPW applies to captured individuals who
meet one of the categories contained in AItide 4. If captured personnel do not fall
~in one of those categories, GPW is ley inapplicable.

"We never recognized the Taliban as the legi timate Afghan government."'"

Contradictory statements.

"The Taliban was not the government of
Afghanistan."'·

The first implies thai the Taliban was the de
jure government. The second contradicts
the first.
First statement is not supported factually.
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Bush adm inistra tion rat ionale for den ial
of prisoner of war statu s to captu red alQaeda and Taliban

Fact ual o r legal d iscrepancy, o r contradictory statements o r act ions by the Bush
adm inistration

Captured al-Qaeda and Taliban «did not
wear uniforms. They' re not easily
identifiable."'"
GPW "req uires soldiers to wear unifonns
that distinguish them from the civilian population. The Taliban did not wear diSlinctive signs, insignias. symbols, or
uniforms."'"

Asswning reference by each was to Article
4A(2), GPW, there is no requirement to
wear uniform, but to wear "a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance."
~Distinctive sign" one of six req uirements
in Article 4A(2), GPW, all of which must be
met.

Factually incorrect: SOF reported both alQaeda and Taliban wore distinctive attire
and by and large were easily identifiable
when assembled as fighting units.'"
US/coalition SOF worked with and wore indigenous (Northern Alliance) attire that
met the "distinctive sign" criteria.
Hypocritical to emphasize «failure to wear
unifonn" as the basis for denial of POW
status when coalition forces were similarly
attired in non-standard (Northern Alliance)
unifonns.

Al-Qaeda and Taliban "don't belong to a
military hierarchy."'"

Statement is factually incorrect, ambiguous,
incomplete.
Taliban had tribal hierarchy. GPW establishes no specific organizational criteria.
Statement fails to emphasize that there are
six criteria in Article 4A(2), GPW, each of
which must be met for entitlement to POW
status.

Taliban hid in mosques. '"

Taking up position in a mosque is not a violation of the law of war. It may result in
the mosq ue relinquishing its nonnal status
as a civilian object and becoming a military
objective,'" but is not necessarily a law of
war violation or a basis for denial of prisoner of war status.

Conclusions and Lessons to Be u arned
This author's remit was to examine the issue of al-Qaeda and the Taliban entitlement to combatant and prisoner of war status. As concluded herein, neither alQaeda nor the Taliban were entitled to lawful combatant or prisoner of war status.

283

Combatants
The author believes the paper would be incomplete if it did not identify lessons
to be learned from the actions taken by the Bush administration and others with respect to this process. Several conclusions or lessons may be drawn from the situation as it existed and the decision-making process related to the law of war status of
al-Qaeda and Taliban captured in Afghanistan between the beginning ofUS/coalition offensive operations in October 2001 and President George W. Bush's decision memorandum of February 7, 2002:
• President George W. Bush was legally correct in concluding that neither alQaeda nor the Taliban met the prerequisites for prisoner of war status, but for the
wrong reasons.
• Both al-Qaeda and the Taliban were private armed groups. Neither
operated as an agent of a government. As such, both groups lacked right
QlItllOrity. the centuries-old prerequisite for entitlement to lawful
combatant and prisoner of war status that is continued in the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. This point was
completely overlooked or ignored in the Bush administration's rationale for
denial of prisoner of war status to captured al-Qaeda and Taliban.
• The Taliban was one faction in a civil war in a failed State. It had
achieved neither status nor international recognition as the de facto or de
jure government of Afghanistan. As was the case with captured al-Qaeda,
Taliban fighters did not meet any of the categories within Article 4, GPW,
for entitlement to prisoner of war status.
• The Bush administration rationale for denial of prisoner of war status
to captured Taliban was fundamen tally flawed in its focus exclusively on the
last four criteria of the six criteria contained in Article 4A (2), GPW, and
inconsistent given US active support of and alliance with Northern Alliance
forces that did not meet the same four criteria.
Arguments by administration officials to "suspend" or minimize GPW
application, and language used to accomplish this in the administration's
rationalization for denial of prisoner of war status, ignored the historic leadership
the United States has exercised in law of war application in general and in
providing humane treatment for captured personnel, even those not entitled to
prisoner of war status.
• The law of war is a highly esoteric subject. It requires careful research,
reading and understanding of treaty texts, their diplomatic history and State
practice, rather than cursory reading and selective use of treaty phrases in a
manner inconsistent with their meaning. No competent lawyer would cite a case
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without reading it in its entirety nor would he or she cite to a court a statutory
provision without researching its law of war history. Making decisions related to
law of war issues requires the same level of research, diligence and competence.
This was not manifested in administration documents related to the
determination of the status of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
o The flawed arguments offered in support of the President's February 7, 2002
decision were politically based rather than based on the law. They ignored the fact
that the 1949 Geneva Conventions were submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification bya Republican president who, as a military officer, led the
Allied campaign to victory against Germany in World War II; that the 1949
Geneva Conventions have been applied in every armed conflict since their
ratification without hesitation by successive administrations (four Republican
and four Democrat), even where questions existed as to their formal application,
because of US leadership in applying the law of war; and that these decisions did
not hinder US military operations or place national security at risk.
o
While his decision on the key point may have been correct, President Bush
erred in accepting the advice of individuals who lacked military experience and indepth knowledge of the law of war, but possessed skepticism, if not disdain, for the
law of war, over that of individuals with military, combat and substantial law of
war expertise and experience. This error affected the credibility of the decision
and damaged the public diplomacy aspect of fighting the transnational terrorist
threat posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups associated with it.

The executive branch possesses the subject-matter expertise capable of
producing a legally accurate, credible and correct document to explain the
rationale for denial of lawful combatant and prisoner of war status to private
armed groups like al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The unnecessarily secretive decisionmaking process leading up to the President 's February 7, 2002 memorandum
failed to utilize the expertise available to it, to its detriment.
o

o The assertion of "universal applicability" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
(by virtue of their ratification or accession by all governments) is in sharp conflict
with the significant failure of their application and implementation by the
majority of State parties. The fundamental inconsistency of Afghanistan's tribal
warfighting culture and history of abuse of innocent civilians and persons hors de
combat with the law of war should have been apparent to and recognized by the
International Committee of the Red Cross in eliciting Afghanistan's ratification of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and by the government of Switzerland, as the
depositary of the Geneva Conventions, in accepting Afghanistan's instrument of
ratification or accession. Law of war treaty ratification should be a matter of
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quality of and capability for implementation, respect and adherence, rather than
mere quantity of State parties. "Universal applicability" means nothing if there is
not universal application.
• Afghanistan's cultural history does not relieve it of its treaty obligations. If
the law of war is to have any relevance, State parties must be held accountable for
their fai lures to take steps beyond merely being a name on the list to implement
them.
• If the International Committee of the Red Cross is to maintain its claim as
the "guardian of the Geneva Conventions," it must do more to gain "universal
application" of law of war treaties to which each State is a party.
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practice of soldiers from the defeated side willingly joining their adversary rather than
being taken prisoner. in some cases, cond uct has been consistent with international
nonns: for example, the ICRC had access to some prisoners during the Soviet
in tervention. Overall, however, compliance with the laws of war has been limited.
Adam Roberts, The LawsofWarin the Waron Terror, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANDTHEWARON
TERROR 191 (Fred L. Borch & Paul S. Wilson eds., 2003) (Vol. 79, US Naval War College
In ternational Law Stud ies).
8. The first US military ground forces to arrive in Afghanistan following the September II,
2001 al-Qaeda hijacking of four commercial airliners and their use in attacks on the twin towers
of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and an unconfirmed third ta rget were US special oper·
ations forces (SOF) who engaged in ground reconnaissance missions preceding US and British
air and cruise-missile attacks against Taliban communication and air·defense targets on October
7,2001. STEPHEN BIDDLE, AfGHANISTAN AND THE FUTURE Of WARfARE: IMPLICATIONS fOR
ARMY AND DEfENSE POliCY 8 (2002). Offensive ground operations began with arrival of US
Army Special Forces Operational Detachments Al pha 555 and 595, 5th Special Forces Group,
which were inserted on th e night of October 19-20, 2001 . CHARLES H. BRISCOE ET AL, WEAPON
OF CHOICE: U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCFS IN AFGHANISTAN 96 (2003). Their entry
was preceded by US and British air and cruise-missile attacks on Taliban positions on October 7,
2001. GARY BERNTSEN & RALPH PUZULO, JAWBREAKER 77 (2005). During the period covered,
US SOF were joined by SOF from Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. The role of British SOF is described in DAMIEN LEWIS, BLOODY HEROfS (2006) .
9. Memorandum from George Bush to Vice President et aI., Humane Treatment of
Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134 (Karen J. Green berg & Joshua Dratel eds., 2005), available at
ht tp://www.pegc. uslarchive/White_Houselbus~memo_2oo20207_ed. pdf [hereinafter Bush
Memorandum ].
10. BRISCOE ET AL, supra note 8, at 2.
II. Id. Professor Frank L. Holt observes:
The long rhythms of Afghan history do show some periods of relative calm durin g
which cities grew, trade ro utes pulsed, irrigated agriculture expanded, and the arts
flourished, but between each renaissance we find an era of ruin brought on or
exacerbated by the parochialism, tribalism, fierce independence, and mutual hostility . ...
These social conditions, not to mention ph ysical challenges of a harsh terrain and
environment, stretch back as far as o ur earliest written sources will carry us. In these
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respects, the twenty-first centu ryC.E. differs very little from the fifteenth or fifth C.E. or
even the fo urth B.C.E.
FRANK L. HOLT, INTO THE LAND OF BoNF.S: ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN AFGHANISTAN 9-10
(2005). See also BYRON FARWEll., QUEEN VICfORIA'S LITTLE WARS 143 (1973); JOHN H.
WALLER, BEYOND THE KHYBER PASS: THE ROAD TO BRITISH DISASTER IN THE FIRST AFGHAN
WAR ix (1990); DAVID LoYN, BUTCHER & BoLT: TwO HUNDRED YEARS OF FOREIGN
ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN xxxvii, 12,20,46, 57,238 (2008); AHMED RASHID, T ALIBAN 910 (2001); STEVE COLI., GHOST WARS 1l0-1l (2004); DALTON FURY, KILL BIN LADEN 139
(2008). In explaining tribal allegiance and its sustainment in today's world, ShullZand Dew offer
the following:
[Sir Edwardl Evans· Pritchard's segmentary-lineage theory was particularly applicable
when the tribal setting was egalitarian. Such tribal groupings are decentralized and
relatively small, numbering no more than several thousand. Building larger units was
difficult because such tribes did not accept the authority of an outside chieftain. Leader
status was gained through charisma, mili tary p rowess, negotiation skills, and moral
status. Consequently, establishing larger tribal organizations in a segmentary. lineage
system was likely only in the even t of an external threat. Otherwise, larger political units
existed, at best, as quasi-states. A ruling lineage can come to be recognized as providing
leadership for a larger group consisting of other lineages-subtribes or clans. However,
the establishment of such a centralized political relationship is complicated and
delicate. Tribal organizations are based on kinship lies and patrilineal descent, making
mo re centralized political organizations atypicaL
SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 50, citing EDWARD EVANS· PRITCHARD, THE NUER, A
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODES OF LIVELIHOOD AND POUTICAL INSTI1VfIONS OF A NILOllC
PEOPLE (1940) and EDWARD EVANS-PRITCHARD, THESANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949). Continuing:
Why, despite the crushing forces of modernity, do [traditional societiesl continue to
end ure? The answer lies in what Ibn Khald un, writing in the fourteenth cen tury, said
about asabiyya. The strength of that solidarity depends on the extent to which a tribe
was segmentary, egalitarian, decentralized, and autonomous. Th us, the underlying
foundation for those forces is the social principle of kinship, which is central to a tribal
society'S main tenance of its union. Tribes end ure when the ties that bind them end ure.
Id. at 51.
With respect to Afghanistan in part icular, ShullZand Dew note that "[ t lhe Afghan tribes have
tolerated state power for the advantages it provides over other tribal rivals. However, the state
doe<; not command the Afghan tribes and in the best of times has only limited authority over
them." Id. at 157.
12. RAsHID, supra note II; SCHEUER, supra note 7, at 108; LoYN, supra note II, at xxxiv,
xxxvii, 12, 20. David Loyn offers an example of the philosophy of decentral ized rule in relating
th at in 1838, following British support for Shah Shuja as king, "[nlone could give a response to
Jabar Khan when he said, ' If Shah Shuja is really a king . . . leave him now wi th usAfghans, and let
him rule ifhe can.m Continuing, Loyn declares:" Afghans would make similar challenges in the
wars th at followed, up to and including the appointment of President [HamidI Karzai by the
U.s." Id. at 46.
13. See SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at ISO-54, for an excellent description of the tribal sys·
tem wi th in Afghanistan and the critical distinctions within and between tribes. See also FARWELL,
supra note II, at 147-48.
14. LOUIS DUPREE, AFGHANISTAN 316 (1973), ascited in BRISCOE ET AI.., supra note 8, at 3.
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15. As Loyn (supra note II, at 147) notes:
The ability of Muslims with different views of Jihad and various political ends to join
against a common enemy wo uld have profou nd importance when the frontier again
became the front line, a crucible of violence, in the contlie! that began in the late
twentieth century. The frontier villages in Waziristan and Tirah that gave the best
support to the Taliban and the foreign figh ters in al-Qaeda were the same ones that had
supported the mujahidin a decade before in the US-backed fight against the Soviet
Union, and had been the quickest to rise against Britain in the nineteenth centuryfinding common ca use against a common enemy-first Bri tain, later the USSR, then
the US- led invasion.
Similarly, STEPHEN TANNER, AFGHANISTAN: A MILITARY HISTORY FROM ALEXANDER THE
GREATTOTHE FALLOFTHE TALIBAN 243 (2002), states: ~The Soviet invasion achieved tha t rarity
in Afghanistan history: a unifying sense of political purpose that cut across tribal, ethnic,
geographic. and economic lines.» On the concept in genera], see SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at
154; FARWELL, supra note 11, at 5, 47, 153-54. On Afghanistan and its history, see SHULrL. &
DEW, supra note 7, at 151-54; WALLER, supra note II, at x; LOYN, supra note 11, at 145-47;
BRISCOE ET At., supra note 8, at 11 . Seea/so Anon., The Liberation ofMtlZtlr·e Sharif 5th SF Group
Conducts UW {Unconventional Warfarel in Afghanistan, SPECIAL WARFARE, June 2002, at 34,
whic h reports with respect to the US Special Forces experience:
The situation on the ground presented challenges... . Altho ugh the major factions were
united in their opposition to the Taliban, they had significant differences with each
oth er, and they fel t no allegiance to anything higher th an their own party or ethnic
gro up. At one time or another d uring the previous decade, the grou ps had taken up
anns against one another or supported each other's rival factions. Although none of
these events were uncommon in internal Afghan politics, th ey created a significant level
of distrust between the factions .

Id. at 39. The anonymous authors are members of 5th Special Forces Group.
16. SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 59.
17. Id. at 62, quoting lOAN M. LEWIS, A PASTORAL DEMOCRACY 27 (1999). Professor Toman
recognizes this with respect to the Taliban, acknowledging, "Knowledgeable experts consider the
Taliban's armed forces were not comparable to an organized army, since th ey had no strategic
military plans, or decision-making power and they resorted to guerrilla tactics." Toman, supra
note 3, at 284.
18. PETER HOPKIRK, THE GREAT GAME (1992); TANNER, supra note 15, at 129-54; WALLER,
supra note 11, at xi FARWELL, supra note 11, at 153-54; LoYN, supra note 11, at 145-47; BRISCOE
ET AL., supra note 8, at 34.
19. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 9-10; LOYN, supra note 11, at xxxvii, 249; FURY,Supra note II,
at 105-()6, 124, 129, 139; Anon., supra note 15, at 38. An example is General Abdul Rashid
Dostum, who
rose to power after th e Soviet invasion in 1979, forming a militia made up mainly of
Uzbeks, who had grown to respect his leadership supporting union workers in the oil
fields . He supported the communist-run government in Kabul until 1992, when he flipflopped and joined his fonner opponent Ahmad Shah Massoud. Mr. Masso ud, known
as the "Panshjer Lion» and head of the Northern Alliance, convinced Gen. Dostum that
the communists were losing ground and tha t he should fight for the winning side . ... In
1994, Gen. Dostum again switched sides, joining G ulbuddin Hekmatyar, a mujahadeen
accused of figh ting his own people more than the SovielSand who is now wanted by the
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u.s.

for suppo rting aI Qaeda and the Taliban.... Gen. Dostwn's decision to join Mr.
Hekmatyar was a major factor in the collapse of a government led by Burhanuddin
Rabbani and Mr. Massoud. Yet, less than two years later, Gen. Dostu m switched again,
realigning with Mr. Rabbani and Ismail Khan, the warlord from Herat, to fight the
ascendant Taliban regime. However, Gen. Dostum was betrayed by one of his own
commanders, who sided with the Taliban. The general fled to Turkey in fear for his life.
Gen. Dostum returned in April 2001 at the urging of Mr. Massoud and reconstituted his
militia to attack the Taliban in the north.
Sara A. Carter, TheArt ofa Warlord: Flip·floppingGeneral aMixed Blessing to U.S. in Afghanistan,
WASH INGTQN TIMES, Oct. 12,2008, at 4-5. See also BRlSCOE ET At., supra note 8, at 2, 95; COLL,
supra note 11, at 234, 236, 348.
20. Readers with greater curiosity or interest would benefit from SHULTZ & DEW, supra note
7, at 159-66; FARWELL, WALLER and LOYN, each supra note 11; HOPKtRK, supra note 18; and
TANNER, supra note 15, at 129-54.
21. LOYN, supra note 11, at 23; SCHEUER, supra note 7, at 113; RASHID, supra note 11, at 54.
These footpaths afforded al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden, his forces and Taliban the opportu·
nity to enter Pakistan, evading capture in late 2001; FURY, supra note 11, at 277-78; TANNER, supra note 15, at 218-19.
22. See SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 166: '!he British presence in Afghanistan had an
important im pact on the modern state of Afghanistan because the British left a legacy of political
boundaries based on their strategic interests rather than on the historical location of tribal peo.
pies. n Similarly, RASHID, supra note 11, at 187, describes the Durand Line as "the disputed
boundary line between the two countries [Pakistan and Afghanistan[ created by the British and
which no Afghan regime has recognized." Interpretations are being offered today by Afghan
Pashtun nationalists that the Durand Line agreement is good for only one hundred years; LOYN,
supra note 11, at 145-47, 167, 182.
23. BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 8, at 8-9.
24. Disregarding Afghan culture, the PDPA attempted to impose communist agricultural
redistribution measures contrary to the long-standing dan and tribal system, providing another
point for resistance to the regime; LOYN, supra note 11, at 184.
25. [d. at 188-93; SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 167-68.
26. GEORGE CRtLE, CHARLIE WIlSON'S WAR (2003), and the very entertaining 2008 movie
of the same name. See also RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF, THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR (Lester W.
Gra u & Michael A. Gress trans., 2002); COlL, supra note 11; SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at
168-76; and LOYN, supra note 11, at 194-207.
27. SHULrl & DEW, supra note 7, at 177-79, identify and describe in detail four major factions as th e mujahidin who allied themselves to figh t the Soviets: " ( 1) fundamentalist Sunni cler·
ics, (2) moderate and radical Sunni Islamists affiliated with the Muslim Broth ers, (3) Wahhab is,
and (4) Shi'ia Islamists," citing OLIVIER ROY, AFGHANISTAN: FROM HOLY WAR TO CIVIL WAR
43-46 (1995). Nonetheless the war lasted almost a decade in part owing to factional differences
wi thin the mujahidin, illustra ting again th e primacy of tribal loyalties; LOYN, supra note 11, at
202. The tenn mujahidin has been traced to the holy man and "reJigious adventurer" Sayyid
Ahmed Shah BreJwi, who returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca to preach war against infidels.
Forming a sect called Mujahidin, he and his followers captured Peshawar in 1829. He was killed
in 1831 . The sect continued, b ut mujahidin eventuaIlyevolved into a tenn to describe indigeno us
fighters. FARWELL, supra note 11, at ISO. In the war against Soviet occu pation, the mujahidin
were not limited to Afghan resistance but induded volun teers from Chechnya and most Arab
nations.
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28. CRILE, supra note 26, at 504; SHULTZ & DEW,supra note 7, at 171 , 176; and COu..supra
note II, at 185. Shu ltz and Dew's observation that ~[ t l he Red Army's . .. conventional military
doctrine and analysis was of no help in analyzing or fighting the asymmetrica1 guerrilla tactics of
a traditional tribal culture" (s upra note 7, at 149) applies eq ually well to the US Army in the
Vietnam War and, more recen tly, in the first four years of Operation Iraqi Freedom as it failed to
recognize it was faced with an insurgency, seeking to apply and uns uccessfully applying conven·
tional war tactics against its "asymmetrical" threat, then waited until it had written and pub·
lished new doctrine jointly with the Marine Corps before beginning to conduct
counterinsurgency operations. For a critique of the Army in the Vietnam War and the Iraq con·
flict that began in 2003, see JOHN A. NAGL, COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM MALAYA AND
VIETNAM: LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A SPOON (2002). The new doctrine is contained in
Headquarters, Department of the Army & Headq uarters, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, FM 3-24/MCWP 3·33.5, Co unterins urgency (2006). The same fail ure to properly
assess the situation occurred with regard to the Bush administration's rationale for its detenni·
nation as to the legal status of the Taliban, discussed infra.
29. LoYN, supra note II, at 208.
30. RAsHID, supra note II, at 32-33; BRISCOEET AL, supra note 8, at l9; LQYN,Supra note II,
at 182,238-39; SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 177-78; COLL, supra note II, at 283-84.
31. LOYN, sllpra note 11,at 215.
32. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 9-10; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AFGHANISTAN: THE FOR·
GOrrEN WAR, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND VIOLATIONS OFTHE LAW OF WAR SINCE SOVIET
WITHDRAWAL (1991 ). LOYN, supra note II, at 114, observes:
Of all of the foreign attempts to control Afghanistan in the two centuries after [British
envoy Mounstuartl Elphinstone's first meeting in 1808, the Soviet invasion in 1979 was
the one that came closest to success. And when the Soviet-backed governmen t finally
crumbled, the disunity of the forces tha t had ousted it flared in to open civil war. Power
had spun out of Kabul, and could not be drawn back. In Afghanistan imposing power
from the center has always been temporary-like gathering together sand or watersince local loyalty outweighs any other.
See also SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 179-80; COLL, supra note II, at 262-63.
33. LoYN, supra note I I, at 211-46, 253-54. In the 1994 battle for Kabul, Najibul lah was
forcibly taken by the Taliban from the United Nations compound in Kabul where he sought asy·
lum in 1972. He and his brother were tortured and castra ted before being hanged. BRISCOE lIT
A1.., supra note 8, at 95; COLL, suprll note I I, at 333; HOLT, supra note II, at 44.
34. Rabbani remained the recognized ruler of Afghanistan, entitled to Afghanistan's seat in
the United Nations d uring the Taliban period. He fonnally handed over power to an interim
government headed by Hamid Karzai on December 22, 2001. See Burhanuddin Rabbani,
GLOBAI.5ECURITI.ORG, hu p:llglobaisecurity.orglmilitary/worldJafghanistan/rabbani.htm (last
visited Feb. 27). RASHID, supra note II, at 10, observes:
Afghanistan was in a stale of virtual disintegration just before the Taliban emerged at
the end of 1994. The country was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords
had fought, switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals
and bloodshed. The predominantly Tajik government of President Burhanuddin
Rabbani controUed Kabul, its environs and the north-east of the country, while three
provinces in the west centring on Herat were controUed by Ismael Khan. In the east on
the Pakistan border three Pashtun provinces were under the independent control of a
councilor Shura (Council) of Mujaheddin commanders based in Jalalabad. A small
region to the south and east of Kabul was controlled by Gulbuddin Hikmetyar.
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In the north the Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum held sway over six provinces
and in Janua ry 1994 he had abandoned his alliance with the Rabbani government and
joined with Hikmetyar to attack KabuL In central Afghanistan the Hazaras controlled
the province ofBamiyan. Southern Afghanistan and Kandahar were divided up amongst
dozens of petty ex-Mujaheddin warlords and bandits who plundered the population at
will. With the tribal structu re and the economy in tatters, no consensus on a Pashtun
leadership and Pakistan's unwillingness to provide military aid to the Durranis as they
did to Hikmetyar, the Pashtuns in the so uth were at war with each other.
35. RAsHID, supra note II, at 90-92. See also SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 180-81.
36. SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 86, 208, 235-36. Not all Taliban were Pashtun, nor were
all Pashtun aligned with the Taliban. For exam ple, Afghanistan's President, Hamid Karzai, is
Pashtun. Dr. Stephen Biddle's excellent stu dy of Operation Enduring Freedom identified three
major components of enemy fighters facing the US· Jed coalition: (a) native Afghan Taliban, (b )
predominantly foreign al-Qaeda and (c) non-al-Qaeda foreign allies of the Taliban. BIDDLE, supra
note 8, at 13. For law of war purposes and as will be explained, only two categories existed: al·
Qaeda and Taliban, and in cases where al-Qaeda served with or led Taliban elements, arguably
only one.
37. SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 7, at 238.
38. Id. at 236.
39. LOYN, supra note 11, at 239 [emphasis provided]. In this regard, see the quotation from
LEWIS, supra note 17.
40. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 39, 53, 59. Dr. Biddle notes, ~The Afghan Taliban were often
poorly trained soldiers. Many had little or no formal military instruction, and Afghan ranks
swelled and shrank with the seasons and the fortunes of war as troops went home to their villages
or took up anns depending on the crop cycle and apparent military need." BIDDLE, supra note 8,
at 15. See also Anon., supra note 15, at 36:
Few of the factional commanders, at any level, possessed any experience in the conduct
of large coordinated offensives. Most were extremely proficient at perfonning small·
uni t actions. But combining their forces (three separate and distinct major formations
and numerous subordinate commands) into a coordinated offensive under one major
fonnation was clearly uncharted territory and a distinct challenge.
On the Afghan practice of switching sides, the article continues:
The Afghan tradition of surrender and transfer of loyalty is not unlike what th e US
experienced during the Civil War (1861-65], with prisoner exchanges, paroles and
pardons. The Afghans, in keeping with th eir custom, expect soldiers who have
surrendered to abide by the conditions of their surrender agreement and to behave
honorably. But the vast numbers of Arabs, Pakistanis, Chechens, Uighers and other
foreign nationals who were members of al-Qaeda ignored the Afghan custom. They
used individual surrenders as a means of furthering their cause, often creating
treacherous conditions.
Id. at 38.
41. SHULrl & DEW, supra note 7, at 253.
42. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 52-53.
43. Id. at 54.
44. COll, supra note 11, at 349.
45. Id.
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46. Id. al 475-76; LOYN, supra nOle II, aI259-62; RAsHID, supra nOle II, al 26, 28-29, 39,
44-45, 52-53; SCHEUER, supra nOIe 7, at III, 113.
47. COLl, supra nOle II, at 349.
48. Id. at 445-46 comments on the ra tionale for UAf recognition:
One of the most passionate h un ters was Sheikh Khal ifa bin Zayed al-Nahayan, the
billionaire crown prince of Ab u Dhabi in the Uni ted Arab Emirates . ... Scores of
equally rich U.A. E. notables flew to Pakistan each season to hunt. So entrenched did the
alliance wilh Pakistan around houbara hunts become that the Pakistani air force agreed
secretly to lease one of its northern air bases to th e [UAE] so that the sheikhs could more
conveniently stage the aircraft and supplies required for th eir hunts. Pakistani
personnel maintained the air base, but the U.A.E. paid for its upkeep. They flew in and
out on C-130s and on smaller planes that could reach remote hunting grounds.
Some of the best win ter houbara gro unds were in Afghanistan. Pakistani politicians had
hosted Arab hunting tri ps there since the mid-199Qs. They had introd uced wealthy
sheikhs to the leadership of the Taliban, creating connections for future finance of the
Islamist militia. Bin Laden circulated in this Afghan hunting world after he arrived in
the country in 1996. So the CIA report th at he had joined a large, stationary camp in
western Afghanistan that winter seemed consistent wi th previous reporting about bin
laden.
The UAE'sAfghanistan western hunting camp played a keypart in ta rget selection forthe August
20, 1998 US cruise· missile strike against al-Qaeda training camps in response 10 the al·Qaeda
attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, discussed infra. Despite its
relationship with the Tal iban, the UAE royal family was cooperative with US planners in
providing information to facilitate identification of the royal family western Afghan h unting
camp, while disavowing its use by al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden. Id. al 448-49.
49. RAsHID, supra note II, at 251 n.4.
50. BRISCOE ET At., supra note 8, at 21; LOYN, supra note II, at 257-58.
51. BRISCOE ET AL., supra nOle 8, at 21.
52. Id.; RAsHID, supra note II, at 5, 44-45, 52-53, 58, 61-63, 72-73, 80, 188-89; COll, supra
note II, at 349.
53. COLl, supra note II, at 350-51; see also RASHID, supra note 11, at 64-66. The princi pal
pro· Taliban proponent wi th in the former Afghanistan embassy, Seraj Jamal, left Washington for
New York to be the Taliban's unofficial (unrecognized) delega tion at the Uni ted Nations; COLt.,
supra, at 351.
54. The government of President Burhan uddin Rabbani continued 10 hold Afghanistan's
Uniled Nalions seat d ur ing the Taliban period.
55. BRISCOE ET At.., supra note 8, at 95.
56. RAsHID, supro note II,al64-74; LoYN, supra note 11, al 253-54; BRISCOE ET AL., supra
note 8, at 22; HUMAN Rl GHTS WATCH, AFGHANISTAN: THE MASSACRE IN MAZAR·I-SHARIF
(1998). Taliban actions prom pted European Union suspension of all hu manitarian aid to areas
of Afghanistan controlled by the Tal iban. RASHID, supra, al 72. The H wnan Rights Watch report
contains a minor error in interchangeably referring to Taliban conduct in Mazar-i-Sharif as acts
of ureprisar or "revenge~ for Taliban losses in its uns uccessful 1997 battle for Mazar-i-Sharif.
The terms are not synonymous, with the former having a very specific meaning in the lawof war.
Altho ugh there may be q uestions as to whether the full range of protections against reprisal was
applicable in Afghanistan's civil war, nonetheless the basic preconditions for executing reprisal
did not exist. See FRITS KAlSHovEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISAlS 339-44 (1971) . The present au·
th or has identified the following criteria for a reprisal:
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1. A reprisal is an act which would be unlawful if not committed for the purpose of a
reprisal
2. It must be done for the purpose of compelling the other belligerent to observe the
law of war.
3. It m ust not be done before other means have been reasonably exhausted.
4. It may be executed only on the express order of higher authority.
5. It must be committed against persons or objects whose attack as a reprisal is not
otherwise prohibited.
6. It must be proportional to the original wrong.
W. Ha ys Parks, A Few Tools in the Prosecution o!WarCrimes, 149 MILITARY L\W REVIEW 73, 84
(1995). See also UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY Of DEFENCE, THE MANUAL Of THE L\W Of
ARMED CONFUcr65, 5.18 and 418-19, 16.16, \6.17 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUALJ. As
noted in this author's article, the tenn ureprisar often is misused when other tenns, such as
Kretaliation," Uretorsion" or even ulawful attack of a militaryobjective,~ might be more accurate.
In the case of Taliban conduct in 1998 in Mazar-i-Sharif, the substantial delay between antiTaliban forces in 1997's and Taliban actions does not suggest its actions were taken ufor the
purpose of compelling the other belligerent to observe the law of war," but were more in line
with tribal acts of revenge in blood feuds. See SHULTZ & DEW, supra note 11, at 157. In this
respect Taliban actions manifest the distinction between a "soldier" and a "warrior" made by
Professor Hugh Turney-High in his classic PRIMITIVE WAR 149-52 (1949) in describing the
revenge mode of a warrior, a trait discussed in the context of Somalia and Afghanistan in SHULTZ
& DEW, supra, at 5-7, 57-100, 147-95.
57. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 75; BERNTSEN & PFZZUlO, supra note 8,at 1-27; COlL,supra
note 11, at 403-05.
58. COLL, supra note 11, at 411.
59. LOYN, supra note 11, at 267. US State Department officials met with Taliban leader Mullah Omar, requesting that he tu m over Usama bin Laden. A quid pro quo of US recognition of the
Taliban in return for the Taliban to tum bin Laden over to it did not ma terialize; COLL, supra
note 11, at 430; BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 8, at 24.
60. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 76; COLL, supra note II, at 548-49.
61. S.c. Res. 1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/l214 (Dec. 8,1998), discussed infra.
62. RAsHID, supra note 11, at 77. UAf recognition had been token at best. As Rashid notes,
following Saudi withdrawal from Afghanistan and its dealings wi th the Taliban, Pakistan remained the Taliban's sole financial provider. Id.
63. S.c. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19,2000); S.c. Res. 1363, U.N. Doc. SJRESJ
1363 (J uly 30, 2001).
64. Rashid reports:
Not surprisingly, Iran, Turkey, India, Russia and four of the five Central Asian
Republics-Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan-have backed the
an ti-Taliban Northern Alliance with anns and money to try and halt the Taliban's
advance. In contrast Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have backed the Taliban . . . . The
Taliban victories in northern Afghanistan in the summer of 1998 ... set in motion an
even fiercer regional conflict as Iran threatened to invade Afghanistan and accused
Pakistan of supporting the Taliban....
RASHID, supra note II, at 5.
65. Id. at 80; COll, supra note II, at 513-15; Report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian im plications of the measures imposed by the Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999)
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and 1333 (2000) on Afghanistan 2-8, U.N. Doc. 512001/695 (July 13, 2001). See also The
situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security: Report of the
5ecretary-General4, 5-9, particularly, 25, U.N. Doc. N55/907-S/2001/384 (Apr. 19, 2001 ) (reporting on the Secretary-General's visit to South Asia), which refers to "fighting throughout Af·
ghanistan," belying media assertions that the Taliban controlled as much as 80 percent of
Afghanistan. So, too, does the Secretary-General's July 13, 2001 report, which states, "All regions
ofthe country, with the exception of the southern [Pashtunl region, now include active conflict
zones." Supra" 48.
66. U.N. Doc. N55/907-S/2001/384, supra note 65; U.N. Doc. 5/2001/695, supra note 65.
Wi th in Afghanistan, the Taliban did not enjoy popular support. BIDDLE, supra note 8, at 16.
Continuing, Dr. Biddle notes that the Taliban was (a) poorly trained, (b) had poor morale and
(c) had a cultural willingness to defect. Id. at 13.
67. See, e.g., S.c. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999), demanding that "the
Taliban tum over Usama bin Laden witho ut further delay to appropriate authorities in a country
where he has been indicted," and further actions by UN members, which refer only to "the
Taliban." See also S.c. Res. 1333, supra note 63, which refers to "areas of Afghanistan under the
control of the Afghan faction known as Taliban, which also calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Af·
ghanistan (hereinafter known as the Taliban?; S.c. Res. 1363, supra note 63, refers to "States
bordering the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control." U.N. Doc. N55/907-S/2001!384,
supra note 65, reporting on the Secretary-General's visit to South Asia and his meeting with
Taliban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil, refers to the Taliban only and not as the
Taliban "regime," much less as the government of Afghanistan.
68. S.c. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001 ).
69. Northern Alliance warlords Dostum and Alia Mohammed renewed offensive operations
one day later; BIDDLE, supra note 8, at 8-10.
70. BRISCOE IT AL, supra note 8, at 188-89; FURY, supra note II, at 275. Biddle states tha t
"{oln the night of December 6, Mullah Omar and the senior Taliban leadership fled the city
(Kand ahar] and went into hiding, ending Taliban rule in Afghanistan," then continues:
Allied forces subsequently tracked a group of al Qaeda survivors thought to include
Osama bin Laden to a series of redo ubts in the White Mountains near Tora Bora. The
redoubts were taken in a 16-day battle ending on December 17, b ut many al Qaeda
defenders escaped death or capture and fled across the border into Pakistan.
BIDDLE, supra note 8, at II.
71. BRISCOE IT AL, supra note8, at 203-16;generaUy, SEAN NAYLOR, NOT A GooD DAY TO
DIE (2005) and PETE BUBER, THE MISSION, THE MEN, AND ME 262-95 (2008), describing Op.
eration Anaconda, March 2- 13, 2002. Taliban restoration and resurgence and the present situa·
tion in Afghanistan are beyond the scope of this article. As no ted, this article considers the status
of the Taliban from the time of commencement of US military operations on October 20, 2001,
to February 7,2002, when President George W. Bush issued his memorandwn concerning the
law of war status of captured al-Qaeda and Taliban. The issue of treatmen t of cap tured al-Qaeda
and Taliban is the subject of separate articles in this volwne by Stephane Ojeda, Matthrw
Waxman and Ryan Goodman.
72. Captured aircraft, tanks and anti-aircraft rquipmen t had become inoperable due to the
Taliban's inability to maintain them. In disbanding the PDPA anny, the Taliban also disbanded
the PDPA units responsible for thrir maintenance and operation. BUBER, supra note 71, at 161 .
73. David Loyn offers this foUowing anecdotr related to th r Taliban's Mullah Omar and his
rrfusal to accep t the basic obligations of UN membership:
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The UN made an effort to engage wilh the new administration, taking a copy of the UN
Charter translated into Pashtu to Kandahar to show the Taliban what it meant to be a
country. An envoy wen t through it page by page, silting cross-legged on Ihe ground, as
he was asked wha t it mean t when it talked of "human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." But Mullah Omar
refused to meet. the UN envoy then or at any other time.

Lom, supra note 11, at 253.
74. fd. at 22-23; seea/so IAN BROWNLIE, PRlNCIPLI'.S OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-67
(1966).
75. GoLDMAN & nTIEMORE, supra note 3, at 24 n.84.
76. The Taliban was not alone in its failure to follow Ihe lawof war in Afghanistan's civil war,
a point acknowledged by Colonel John M ulholland, 51h Special Forces Group commander, in
advising his command that "[ n[o one [the Afghan warlords] here is clean." BRISCOE ET M., supra
note 8, at 95. This demonstrates Ihis author's earlier point of a distinction between legal applicability of law of war (reaties and application in fact.
77. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, I INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPIJED
BY THE UNITED STATES 15S-59 (2d rev. ed. 1951).
78. fd. at 159-60.
79. fd. at 156-57.
80. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 1907,36 Stat.
2227, reprinted in TH E LAWS OF ARMED CONFIJCfS, supra note I, at 66 (emphasis provided)
(hereinafter Hague IV Annex] . Seea/so WSA OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW, DISPUTES,
WAR AND NEUTRAIJTY 434--45, § 167 (Hersch Lauterpacht 00., 71h 00. 1952) [hereinafter
LAUTERPACHT].
81. Hague IV Annex, supra note 80, art. 43.
82. SPAIGHT, supra note 4, at 327; UK MANUAL, supra note 56, at 275,,. 11.3, states:
To detennine whether a state of occu pation exists, it is necessary to look at the area
concerned and detennine whether two conditions are satisfied: first, that the former
governmen t has been rendered inca pable of publicly exercising its authority in that
area; and, secondly, that the occupying power is in a position to substi tute its own
authority for Ihat of the former government.
Applying by analogy this test to Ihe Taliban, while the Taliban may have physically occu pied
substantial areas of Afghanistan, persistent resistance to the Taliban-as acknowledged in UN
reports-precluded it from meeting the second part of the test. The first part occurred through
the meltdown of the PDPA between 1992 and 1994. The second part never took place.
The challenge th e Taliban faced has historical precedent. A Russian analysis of British failures
in its Sa:ond Anglo-Afghan War concluded, "English commanders und erstood that they had
not gained possession of all these strips of country over wh ich Ihe (roops had passed, but only of
the actual ground on which their forces were encamped." LOYN, supra note 11, at 11 4. This was
Ihe predicament the Taliban faced and suggests the media's failu re to appreciate the distinction
between physical presence and control sufficient to govern.
83. Supra note 65.
84. The present author may have con tributed to Professor Toman's concl usion that the
Taliban was the de facto government. As he no tes in his article, supra note 3, in reply to an email from Professor Toman, the presen t author staled, An argument might be made Ihat the
Taliban was the de facto government of Afghanistan until early October 2001, as it occ up ied 80%
U
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of Afghanistan.~ This infonnal response was based entirely on media reports, as the present au ·
thor had not been involved in Operation Enduring Freedom issues or had access to official reo
ports or analyses. The addi tional information obtained in research for and presented in this
article presents a substantially different and more accurate picture.
Even were one to argue that at the time ofTaliban recognition by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
the UAE the Taliban was the de facto government, Professor Brownlie notes that "[ilt issometimes
said that de jure recognition is irrevocable while de facto recognition can be withdrawn. ~
BROWNLIE, supra note 74, at 87.
85. Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in THE LAwS OF
ARMED CONFllCfS, supra note I,at 507 [hereinafterGPW Convention]. This section is derived
from W . H ays Parks, Jus in Bello in the Struggle against Terrorism, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUG·
GLE: AGAINST TERROR (John Norton Moore & Robert Turner eds., forthcom ing).
86. See U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2(02).
87. The just war tradition is an historic articulation of wilen (jus ad bellum) it is justifiable for
a State to resort to arms, and what (jus in bello) use of force is legally pennissible. See JAMES
TuRNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR AND THE RFSfRAINTOF WAIl.. (1981).
88. Gerald I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilln Warfare,
BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 173, 176 (1971);Gerald lAD. Draper, The Present UlW of Comootancy, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CONFllCfS: THE SELECTED
WORKS ON THE LAwS OF WAR BY THE LATE PROFfSSQR COWNEL G.I.A.D. DRAPER, OBE 195
(M ichael A. Meyer & Hilaire McCoubrey eds., 1998). See also MAURICE H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF
WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 13-15,69 et seq. (1965) .
89. KEEN, supra note 88, at 50.
90. The classic example is the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Aus·
trian throne, by the Slav Gavrilo Princip, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, generally regarded as the
spark that ignited World War I. This principle is made clear in the US Constitu tion, which vests
in the President of the Uni ted States the authority to act as commander in chief of US anned
forces (Article II, § 2) and in the US Congress the authority to raise armies and navies and to de·
clare war (Article I, § 8). 18 U.S.c. § 960 (2000) (Neutrali ty Act) makes it a criminal offense for a
person within the United States to begin, set on foot, provide for or prepare "a means for or (fur.
nish ] the money for, or [take] part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to becarried
on .. . against the terri lOry or dominion of any foreign . . . state . . . with whom the United States is
at peace . . . . " See, e.g., United States v. Stephen E. Black and Joe D. Hawkins, 685 F.2d 132 (5 th
Cir. 1982), a case in which US citizens were convicted of violation of the Neutrality Act. A narra·
tive history of th e case is STf:WART BELL, BAYOU OF PIGS (2008).
91. HYDE, supra note 77, at 1692, 1797; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 50, at 203-05.
92. Additional Protocol I, supra note I, art. 51(3); Additional Protocol II, supra note I, art.
13(3).
93. Denial of quarter includes refusal to accept an offer to surrender and summaryexerution
upon capture.
94. Mosby's unit operated under a commission issued by the Governor of Virginia. State
commissions were a practice common for Union and Confederate forces. Recei pt and retention
of a governor's commission were dependent upon a unit carrying out its operations in unifonn
under a commander responsible for its actions, and com pliance wi th the law of war. JEFFRY D.
WERT, MOSBY'S RANGERS 62-63, 69-71, 76, 77-78, 124, lSI, IS7 (1990).
95. MICHAEL FELLMAN, INSIDE WAR: THE GUERRIlLA CONFllCf IN MISSOURI DURING THE
CIVIL WAR (1 989), describes Quantrill's actions and modus operandi.
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96. See RI CHARD HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AN D THE LAW Of WAR 2- 16, 31-44, 56, 60
( 1983). A traditional term is unprivileged belligerent, meaning a private individ ual not entitled to
the combatant's privilege. Other commonly used tenns are unprivileged combatant and unmwful
combatant. The tenn adopted by the Bush administration--enemy combatant-was coun ter to
its own arguments, as it incorrectly equated captu red Taliban and al-Qaeda to lawful enemy
com batants. The term "unlawful enemy combatant" is potentially misleading, as it suggests a
membe r of regular military forces of a government may be denied prisoner of war status because
he or she has acted in a manner inconsisten t with the law of war or committed other criminal
acts. In accordance with Article 85, GPW, a pre-capture offense does not provide a basis 10 deny
prisoner of war status to an individ ual who meets any of the categories in Article 4. As was the
case with many law of war decisions by Bush administration officials d uring the period in ques·
tion, "enemy comba tan t ~ was selected more for political purposes than for legal accuracy.
97. As used in Article 3, Knoncombatants" refers to military medical personnel and cha p.
lains rather th an civilians.
98. Named for its sponsor, Russian delegate Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens ( 1845-1909).
99. The debate was limi ted to a form of extended levte en masse following enemy occupa·
tion. A private citizen who took up anns against his or her own government or against another
government with which his or her nation was at peace remained an unprivileged combatant.
100. FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAG ING Of WAR 14 (1987 ). Professor
Kalshoven notes that Klt lhis phrase, altho ugh formulated especially with a view 10 the thorny
problem of armed resiSlance in occupied territory, has acquired a significance far exceeding that
particular p robl em. ~ Continuing, he says that '"lilt implies no more and no less than th at, no
matter what States may fail to agree upon, the conduct of warwill always be governed by existing
princi ples of international law."
101. THE LAwSOf ARMED CONFUCTS, supra note l, aI 70. Article 2 providing lawful combat·
ant sta tus to members of a levee en masse was amended to require that its members carry their
arms openly in addition to respecting the laws and cusloms o f war.
102. SPAIGHT, supra note 4, at 37.
103. See EARl F. ZIEMKE & MAGNA E. BAUER, MOSCOW TO STALINGRAD: DECISION IN THE
EAsT 199-21 9, 252- 54, 330, 434-35 (rev. ed. 1985).
104. Represen tative histories are HENRI MICHEL, THE SHADOW WAR: EUROPEAN
RfSI STANCE, 1939-1945 (Richard Barry trans., 1972); MICHAEl R. D. FOOT, REsISTANCE:
EUROPEAN REsISTANCE TO NAZISM, 1940-1945 ( 1977); J0RGEN HA'.STRUP, EUROPE ABLAZE
(1978 ); DAVID STAfFORD, BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN REsISTANCE, 1940-1945 (\980), CHARLF.S
CRUICKSHANK, S.O.E. IN THE FAR EAST ( 1983); WILLIAM MACKENZIE, THE SECRET HISTORY Of
SOE: THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS ExECUTI VE, 1940-1945 (1948, 2000); FRANCIS B. MILLS,
ROBERT MIllS & JOHN W. BRUNNER, OSS OPERATIONS IN CHINA (2002). The present author
has iden tified organized resistance movements authorized by exiled governments and provided
SOE and OSS assistance in Albania, Belgium, Burma, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Fin·
land, France, Greece, Indo-China, Ital y, Malaya, NOrway, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, Singapore,
Sumatra, Thailand and Yugoslavia.
105. Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.lA.S. 3362, 75 U.N.T.5. 31 , reprinted in THE L\WS Of
ARMED CONFUcrs, supra note I, at 459.
106. Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3217, T.l.A.S. 3363, 75 U.N.T.5. 85, reprinted in THE L\WS Of
ARMED CONFUcrs. supra note I, at 485.
107. Supra note 85.
108. Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3516, T.lAS. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in THE LAwS Of
ARMED CONFUcrs. supra note I, at 575.
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109. The absence of treaty protection for civilian medical facilities and transport and
wounded, sick or shipwrecked civilians was corrected in the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II.
See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note I, arts. 8-31; MICHAEL BoTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH
& WALDEMARA. SOlF, NEW Rum FOR V[Cl"IMS OF ARMED CONFUCl"S 89-167 (1982) .
110. In the United States, this includes activated reserve and National Guard forces.
Ill. GPW Convention, supra note 85, art. 4A(2) (em phasis provided).
112. COMMENTARY III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
OF WAR 50 (Jean S. Pictel ed., 19(0) (hereinafter Pictet GPW].
113. Article 2 Common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions states in part: "(Tlhe present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other anned conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by
one of them." "High Contracting Parties" means nations who are State parties to the Geneva
Conventions. ~High Contracting Parties" distinguished between nations who had ratified or acceded to the Geneva Conventions and those who were not yet party to and bound by the Geneva
Conventions. As all 194 nations are now parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, they have uni·
versal applicability. As this author notes herein, applicability does not necessarily translate into
application by State parties.
Article 2 Common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions does not define war. It establishes
the threshold for application of th e four Conventions to, inter alia, ~aU cases of declared war or
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them." In contrast, the judgment in United
States v. Willrelm von Leeb et al. (The High Command Case, XI TWC 485 (1948) defines war
more broadly as "the exerting of violence by one state or politically organized body against
another. In other words, it is the implementation of a political policy by means of violence."
There are two points of significance to th e current discussion. First, the authors of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and particularly th e prisoner of war convention, were very deliberate in
declining to recognize combat operations by a government against a private, politically
organized body such as the Taliban as an armed conflict in which the Geneva Conventions
technically or formally applied. Second, ignorance of history by the Bush admin istration
resulted in faulty analysis and justification for its actions with respect to captured Taliban and al·
Qaeda.
114. Prisoner of war entitlement for actions as a levee en masse cease followingenemyoccupa.
tion. Article 4A(6), GPW, expressly states, "Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having
had time to form themselves into regular anned units, provided they carry their arms openly and
respect the laws and customs of war." Thereafter members of a levee en masse cease to exist as
such and must meet each of the six criteria in Article 4A(2), GPW, to receive entitlement to pris·
oner of war status.
115. Pictet G PW, supra note 112, at 57, states, Hit is essential tha t there should be a de facto reo
lationship between the resistance organization and the party (sic] to intemationallaw which is in
a state of wac, but th e existence of this relationship is sufficien t," commenting further that such a
relationship "may be indicated by deliveries of equi pment and supplies, as was frequently the
case during the Second World War, between the Allies and the resistance networks in occu pied
territories." In addition to the general histories noted supra note 104, British and US sealift and
airlift support to organized resistance movements in Axis-occupied nations is described in DA·
VID HOWARTH, THE SHETLAND BUS (1951); III THE ARMY AIR FORCFS IN WORLD WAR li Eu·
ROPE: ARGUMENT TO V-E DAY, JANUARY 1944 TO MAY 1945, at 493-524 (Wesley Frank Craven
& James Lea Cate eds., 1951); GIBB MCCAL1., FUGHT MOST SECRET: AlR MISSIONS FOR SOE AND
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OSS (1981); BEN PARNELL, CARPETBAGGERS: AMERICA'S SECRET WAR IN EUROPE (1987);
BROOKS RICHARDS, I SECRET FLOlllUS: CLANDESTINE SEA OPERATIONS IN BRITIANY, 19401944 (2004); BROOKS RICHARDS, II SECRET FLOlllUS: CUNDESTINE SEA OPERATIONS IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN, NORTH AFRICA, AND THE ADRIATIC, 1940-1944 (2004).
116. Pictet GPW, supra note 112, at 57 n .2, offers the example of the July 15, 1944 declaration
by US General Dwigh t D. Eisenhower, Sup reme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
(S HAEF) commander, recognizing the Free French Forces of the Interior and taking th em under
his command.
117. Toman, supra note 3, at 290-94; Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of
Guerrilla Warfare, supra note 88, at 176.
118. The four criteria were relaxed in Articles 43( I) and 44(3) of 1977 Additional PrOlocol l,
the lalter req ui ring only that an individ ual entitled 10 combatant status under that treaty "carry
his arms openly (a) du ring each m ilitary engagement, and (b) during such time as he is visible 10
the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack
in which he is 10 participate." This change is not relevant to the current discussion, as neither Af·
ghanistan nor the United States is a party to Additional Protocol I.
119. 2A FINAL REcoRD Of THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at 433. Other
delegations offered similar comments.
120. See gelrerally, YOSSEF BODANSKY, BIN LADEN: THE MAN WHO DECURED WAR ON
AMERICA (2001); ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE Al QAEDA (2002); BRISCOE ET AI.., supra note 8,
at 23; Toman, supra note 3, at 287-89. YAROSuV TROFIMOV, THE SIEGE OF MECCA 7, 246-47
(2007), attributes Saudi Arabia's attack on Muslim extremists, led by Juhayman al Uteyhi, who
seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca on September 20, 1979, as the point at which Usama bin
Laden began to separate himself from the Saudi royal family.
121. LOYN, supra note II, al 262-63.
122. GoLDMAN &TITTEMORE, supra note 3, at 29.
123. Toman, supra note 3, at 294. Professor Toman characterizes al-Qaeda through the fol·
lowing words of other experts:
A question under the Hague Regulations and the Third [Geneva] Convention involves
the status of an independent force, which has no factual link to a Party to an
in ternational armed conflict. In general, it may be said that such a force would probably
be viewed as waging a p rivate war. In any event, it would have no status better than that
of insurgents in a non-international armed conflict, unless the movement they
represen t has such de facto objective characteristics of belligerency th ai the movement
itself could be recognized as a Party to an international anned conflict.

Id. at 291-92, quoting BoTHE, PARTSO-/ & SOlF, supra no te 109, at 235. Professor Toman's
conclusion is thaI al·Qaeda does not meet the objective characteristics of belligerency. Id. at 294.
124. For example, civilians who accompany the anned forces are entitled to prisoner of war
sta tus under Article 4, paragraph 4, G PW, but do nOI enjoy the combatant's privilege.
125. In such an analysis, the first q uestion should be whether there is an international anned
conflict, as defined in Article 2 Common to the fo ur 1949 Geneva Conventions (~all casesof de·
clared war or of any other anned conflict which may arise between two or more of the H igh Con·
tracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them"). Failing to meet the
prerequisites in Common Article 2, there is no basis for considering provisions contained in Ar·
ticle 4, GPW.
126. Pictet GPW, supra note 112, at 18.
127. ~Party to the conflictHwas broadened to include a limi ted range of private anned groups
in Articles 1(4) and 43(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 1. As noted supra note 1,
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as neither Afghanistan nor the United States is a party to Additional Protocol I, the change is no t
applicable. Had it been applicable, the Taliban would not have qualified as a party to the conflict
as it met none of the criteria in Article 1(4). Since Addi tional Protocol I's entry into force on December 7, 1978, no private armed group has qualified as a «Party to the conflict.~
128. HOWARD S. LEVIE, PRISONERS Of WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLiCt" 36 (Vol.
59, US Naval War CoUege International Law Studies, 1979).
129. See, e.g., HERBERT W. MCBRIDE, A RIfLEMAN WENT TO WAR (1 935), detailing the ac·
countof a US citizen who joined and fough t asa member of the 21st Battalion, Canadian Expedi.
tionary Force, in World War 1.
130. For example, on July 14, 1940, the New York Herald Tribune contained a British adver·
tisement inviting individuals with aircraft experience to join the Royal Air Force (RAP); others
already had joined and fo ught in the RAP in the Battle for France. O thers quickly followed. RICH·
ARD HOUGH & DENIS RlCHARDS, THE BATTLE OF BRITAlN 187-88 (2008). In total, 547 men
from thirteen nations, incl uding seven US citizens, served as aircrew wi th the RAP during the
1940 Battle of Britain. Id. at 191. Similarly, Draper Kauffman attended the US Naval Academy
but was screened out as the res ult of his pre.commissioning eye examination. Seven years later,
as an ambulance driver in the American Volunteer Ambulance Corps of the French Army, he
was ca ptured by invading Gennan forces. Even tually released, he was commissioned in the Royal
Navy, where he served as a bomb disposal officer. That he was an American ci tizen serving first
with French military and later with British naval forces wo uld not have been a basis for Gennan
denial of prisoner of war status. (Returning 10 the United States on convalescent leave, he reo
ceived a commission in the US Navy. He earned a Navy Cross as a result of his clearing Japanese
bombs dropped during the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, then was assigned to estab·
lish training for and to form up naval combat demolition units, forerunner of the Navy's underwater demolition teams and laday's SEAls.) See ELIZABETH KAUffMAN BUS H, AM.ERlCA'S FIRST
FROGMAN: THE DRAPER KAUFFMAN STORY ix, x, 1-12, 19,23-25,32-43,62-63,78-82 (2004).
131. See, e.g., Paul ine Jelinek, Pentagen Seeks Recruits on Visas, W ASHINGTON TiMfS, Dec. II ,
2008, at B8.
132. Pictet GPW, supra note 112, at 53-58, contains an excellen t summary of the negotiating
history.
133. FELLMAN, supra note 95.
134. Parks, supra note 85.
135. BIODLE, supra note 8, at 22, states that the Ism ceased its logistical support to the TaI iban
on October 12,2001, while acknowledging that it may have con tin ued after that da te.
136. Its history is contained in INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, I REPORT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITI"EE OF THE RED CROSS ON ITS AcnVlTIfS DURING THE
SECOND WORLD WAR (September I, 1939-June 30, 1947) (General Activities) 519-20, 532-33
(1948).
137. Pictel GPW, supra note 112, at 62. While ICRC focus was on the Free French, actual
practice was far broader. See, e.g., POLISH AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION, DFSTINY CAN WAlT: THE
POLISH AIR FORCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1949).
138. GPW Convention, supra note 85, art. 4A(I ).
139. Id., art. 4A(2) .
140. Id., art. 2.
141. Citing INTERNATIONAL COMMI1TEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE
CONFER£NCEOF GoVERNMENT ExPERTS 106-(17 ( 1948).
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142. A specific reference/mention of~lm l ercenaries who devastated France in the XIVth cen·
tury, d uring the peaceful periods of the Hundred Years War." Pietet GPW, supra note 112, at 63
n.3.
143. Id. at 62-64.
144. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
145. Pictet GPW, supra no te 112, at 67.
146. Id. at 68.
147. Having resolved the iss ue th at p rompted the original Martens Oause in the 19()7 Hague
IV, th e Martens Oause was relegated to the article common to the fo ur 1949 Geneva Conven·
tions dealing with denunciation of (wi thdrawal from ) the Geneva Conventions by a State party.
See, e.g., GPW Convention, supra note 85, art. 42(4); Pietet GPW, supra note 112, at 648.
148. Parks, supra note 2.
149. Yoram Dinstein, Unlawful Combatancy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR ON
TERROR, supra note 7, at 159, discussed infra. However, under Article 85, GPW, they retain th eir
entitlement to prisoner of war status.
ISO. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021,
118 L.N.T.S. 343, reprillted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFUCfS, supra note I, at 421 . Article I,
paragraph I states: "The present Convention shall apply witho ut prejudice ... ( I ) To all persons
referred to in Art icles 1, 2 and 3 of the Regulations to the Hague Convention (IV) of 18 October
19()7 . .. who are captured by the enemy."
151. A legal requirement th at regular forces wear uniforms in order to enjoy entitlement to
prisoner of war status would have exceeded the requirement in th e 1899 and 19()7 Hague treaties
and Article 4A(2), GPW, which does not specify a ~uniformn but merely u a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance . ~ As indicated in the p revio us discussion of Lieber's 1863 analysis and
the argument put forward by Belgium and other nations in 1899, delegates were aware of the ex·
istence of irregular forces based upon th e experience of the Franco-Prussian War and Anglo·
Boer War. Expansion of special operations forces in Worl d War II brought the iss ue to the fore .
152. Dinstein, supra note 149, at 164; Roberts, supra note 7, at 212.
Department of th e Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare para. 63 ( 1956) states:
"Commando forces and airborne troops, although operating by highly trained methods of
surprise and violent combat, are entitled, so long as they are members of the organized anned
forces of the enemy and wear uniforms, to be treated as prisoners of war upon capture, even if
they operate singly.n That language is ambiguous in its failure to explain what constitutes a
"uniform," and potentiany more restrictive th an th e text contained in earlier editions of the US
manuaL For example, Chief of Staff, Department of War, Rules of Land Warfare, at 22, para. 33
(1914) states: "The distinctive sign. This requirement win be satisfied by the wearing of a unifonn
or even less than a complete uniform." This text was deleted, apparently for brevity, in the 1940
edition; the 1914 edition contained 221 pages, while the 1940 edition was reduced to 123. The
necessity for paragraph 33 of the 1914 edition may have not been recognized in light of the US
World War I experience in fighting uniformed enemy forces in conventional militaryoperations
on wen-defined fronts; nor is it likely organized resistance movements were contemplated. The
1940 US manual contains an official publication date of October 1, 1940. The British SOE was
established under highly classified circumstances on July 22, 1940; the US OSS did not follow
until two years later, on July 21,1942. Parks, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY
OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 84 and 85 n.69. As SOE historian M.R.D. Foot points out, "A dense
veil of secrecy was indispensable to SOE, a body for moun ting surprise attacks in unexpected
places: no secrecy, no surp rise. The fact that the body existed at all was for long a closely guarded
secret. ~ MICHAEL R. D. FOOT, SOE IN FRANCE 13 (2d rev. ed. 20(4) . That SOE and OSS
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operations and tactics, techniques and procedures were highly classified may have played a part
in incorporation of the erroneous language contained in paragraph 63 of the 1956 edition of the
manual. But itsauthor(s) should have been cognizant of the change made in article 4A(2), GPW,
and the rationale for it.
Due to its ambiguity and inconsistency with State practice, including US practice in World
War ll, the 1956 text is clarified in the forthcoming Department of Defense LawofWar ManuaL
153. Parks, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 2, annex
at 92-99.
154. See, e.g., AlL\N ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRlSQNERSOF WAR: A STUDY IN INTER·
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLlCfS 349 (1976) (uThe concept
of unifonns has never been explicitly defined in international law) .
155. Id. at 78-81 . As noted therein, the ICRC Comme1lttlryon the 1977 Additional Protocols I
and II states:
What constitutes a uniform, and how can emblems of na tionality be distinguished from
each other? The Conference in no way intended to define what constitutes a
unifonn . ... K[Alny customary unifonn which clearly distinguished the member
wearing it from a non-member sho uld suffice. ~ Thus a cap or an ann let etc. worn in a
standard way is actually equivalent to a unifonn.
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 468 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno
Zimmennann eds., 1987).
156. BoTHE, PARTSCH & SOlF, supra note 109, at 257.
157. See, e.g., JEREMY WIlSON,LAWRENCE OF ARABIA 1043 ( 1990), relating the death of Brit·
ish Army captain WiDiam H.1. Shakespear, easily identified , targeted, and kiDed in 1915 by a
sniper in the forces of pro-Turkish leader Ibn Rashid, as Shakespear insisted on wearing his Bri tish uniform rather th an dressing in indigenous attire to appear like the forces to which he was assigned. This prom pted Bri tish Anny Captain T.E.Lawrence to don Arab clothing as he led the
Arab revolt against Ottoman rule. Jd. at 1043 n.4, and further discussion in Parks, ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 100-0 1 n .5.
158. Parks, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw ANOMIUTARY OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 101
n .6; FuRY, supra note 11, at 100, 167.
159. According to one SOF commander, Taliban wore black on black, with tu rbans; aI Qaeda,
all black, with hoods to mask their faces; Northern Alliance, a pakol (chitrali hat) and the
Massoud scarf; US SOF, p art ial US uniform and Northern Alliance attire. FURY, sllpra note 11, at
119, 167; see also Parks, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND MilITARY OPERATIONS, supra note
2, at 101; BUBER, supra note 71, at 243, 247 for the US SOF rationale, which did not involve per·
fidy. Anon., supra note 15, at 36, acknowledged, U!B]ecause the dispara te forces lacked any sem·
blance of a uniform, visual identification, particulnrly at Inng distances, was virt ually impossible.
The tasks of preventing fratricide and synchronizing m ultiple combat elements fell to the SF
[Special Forces] detachments~ (emphasis supplied). A distinction existed in Taliban operations
when a single or a few Tal iban wo uld conceal himself/themselves within a crowd of innocent ci·
viliansin order to carry out an attack; such an act would be perfidy. US SOF wear of North em Al·
liance attire, though much publicized, was limited as to time, unit, specific unit personnel,
location of operations and mission. Parks, supra, at 84.
160. Hague IV Annex, supra note 50, art. 23 states, uln addi tion to the prohibitions provided
byspoci al Conventions, it is especially forbidden: ... (b) To kiD or wound treacherously individ·
uals belonging to the hostile nation or army.
H
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Afghanistan is not a State party to the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) nor its 1899 predecessor,
Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which contained
the same prohibition.
161. The official English text states "the feigning of civilian, non-combatant status." The official French text correctly states "feindre d'avoir Ie statut de civil ou de non-combatan t," that is,
"the feigning of civilian or non-combatan t status," the two categories being distinctive. BoTHE,
PARTSCH AND SOLF, supra note 109, at 206 n.21 . Asnoted, neither the United States nor Afghanistan is a party to the 1977 Additional Protocol!. However, the definition of perfidy (using the
French text) is consistent with State practice and has been applied by US military forces in conflicts since 1977.
As the present author has noted, the legal approach of the prereq uisite of perfidy is not new;
see Parks, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at 82.
162. Bush Memorandum, supra note 9.
163. Key documen ts in the interagency debate are Memorandum from John C. Yoo & Robert
Delah untyto William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Re: Application of
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 9, at 38, available at http://www.slate.com/featureslwhatistorture/
LegalMemos.html [hereinafter Yoo J; Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to the President,
Decision Re Application of th e Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with AI
Qaeda and th e Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.slate.comffeatures/whatistorture!
LegalMemos.html lhereinafterGonzalesl; Memorandum from Colin L Powell to Counsel to the
President & Assistan t to the President for National Security Affairs, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS, supra, at 122, available at http://
www.slate.comffeatureslwhatistorturelLegalMemos.html [hereinafter Powell]; Letter from
John Ashcroft to the President (Feb. 1, 2002), reprinted in id. at 126, available at http://
www.slate.com/featureslwhatistorture/ LegalMemos.html {hereinafter Ashcroft]; Memorandum from William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Department of State to Counsel to the President,
Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Conventions (Feb. 2, 2002), reprinted in id. at 129,
available at http://www.slate.comffeatureslwhatistorture/LegaIMemos.html [hereinafter Taft J.
164. GoLDMAN & TITIEMORE, supra note 3; Toman, supra note 3.
165. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). The present author's assignment
was to establish the status of those persons caplured during the specified time frame. Their treatmen t and US Supreme Court cases dealing with their treatment are beyond the scope of this author's remit.
166. The US military provided prisoner of war protection (if not status per se) to individuals
it captured on the battlefield in its operations in the Rep ublic of Vietnam ( 1964-72), Grenada
(1983), Panama (1989-90), Iraq (1990-91), Somal ia (1992- 94) and Haiti (commencing in
1994); personal knowledge of author, who was responsible for the legal aspects of this iss ue
within the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Anny from 1979 to 2003.
167. Yoo, supra note 163, at 2; Ashcroft, supra note 163, at 1; Gonzales, supra no te 163, at I.
168. Powell, supra note 163, at «Comments on the Memorandum of January 25, 2002." The
statement undo ubtedly is factually correct, but does not respond to th e condusion reached by
Yoo, Ashcroft and Gonzales. The Uni ted States may have opted not 10 comment with regard to
the situation in Afghanistan (a) for fear of jeopardizing the fragile status of the government of
Burhan uddin Rabbani and its entitlement to the Afghan seat in the United Nations coveted by
the Taliban, (b) to avoid interference in the civil war andlor (e) to resist the conclusion tha t a
"failed State~ would be relieved of its treaty obligations.
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169. Gonzales, supra note 163, at 3.
170. Powell, supra note 163, at «Comments on the Memorandum of Jan uary 25, 200r; and
personal knowledge of the present author, who was directly involved in issues related to prisoner
of war treatment for captured members of the Panamanian Defense Forces; see supra note 166.
Judge Gonzales' statement also errs in suggesting a separate policy decision was made for Opera.
tion Just Cause (Panama, 1989-90).
171. Taft , supra note 163, as attachment thereto.
172. Id.
173. Press Release, Office of th e White House Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at
Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2002l0802detainees
.htm [hereinafter White House Fact Sheet ].
174. Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing (Feb. 7, 2002), transcript available at http://www.presidency
.ucsb.edulwsfindex.p hp?pid=61628.
175. Sec.retaryof Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, DoD News Brief·
ing (Feb. 8, 2(02), transcript available at h ttpllwww.defenselink.miVtranscriptsitranscript.aspx
?transcriptid=2624 [hereinafter Rumsfeldl.
176. Id.
177. The rationale offered by Bush administration officials incorrectly listing a unifonn reo
quirement neglects a key historical poin t from the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush ad·
ministrations-which included key participants in developing the erroneous «uniform"
rationale for denial of prisoner of war status to captu red al-Qaeda and Taliban-i.e., th at both
administrations supported (wi th weapons and funding) the mujahidin resistance against th e So·
viet occupation. The mujahidin wore the same or similar attire as the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance, and in many instances were the same persons who fought for the Taliban or the Northern Alliance. As the United States was no t a party to the confl ict against the Soviet occupation,
and the Soviet Union had established a belligerent occupation, the mujahidin were not entitled
to prisoner of war status under Article 4A(2) (organized resistance movement of a party to the
conflict) or 4A(6) (levee en masse). If one follows th e natural logic of the George W. Bush admin·
istration regarding the status of the Tal iban, then arguably it is condemning the support of th e
previous administrations for the mujahidin or acting with hypocrisy.
17S. Parks, ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note 2, at
516-19.
179. [d. at 496-98, 517, 522-23. US SOF who were involved in these operations and with
whom the author has spoken have indicated there was no difficulty by either side in identifying
opposing forces when o pe rating as units.
ISO. See, e.g., GOLDMAN & TrITEMORE, supra note 3,at 25-26, 28; and Toman, supra note 3,
at 281.
lSI. Wh ite Ho use Fact Sheet, supra nOle 173.
IS2. Id.
183. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
IS4. Bush Memorandum, supra note 9.
ISS. Fleischer, supra nOle 174.
186. Id.
187. Id.
ISS. Wh ite Ho use Fact Sheet, supra nOle 173.
189. Fieischer, supra note 174.
190. Rumsfeld, supra note 175.
191. 5£e, e.g., FURY, supra note 11, at 93.
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192. Fleischer, supra note 174.
193. Rwnsfeld, supra note 175.
194. Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I defines militaryobjecriveas ~thoseobjects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a defini te mili tary advantage." The same definition is contained in Article 2(6) of the
Amended Mines Protocol (II), Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and Ar·
ticle 1(3) of CCW Protocol III (Incendiary Weapons). As the United States is a party to CCW
Amended Mines Protocol, it accepts this defini tion. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended May 3, 1996,2048 U.N.T.S. 133;
Protocol on Prohibi tionsor Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342
U.N.T.S. 171; both reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFUCI"S, supra note I , at 196 and 210,
respectively.
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